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Abstract 
Pain is a fundamental part of the human condition. It aids survival, indicates threats to 
bodily integrity, and forms a part of life-transitions and rites of passage from childbirth to death. 
Pain is experienced within a sociocultural context and attracts a constellation of different meanings 
– pain as damage, a sign of effort, or pain as cleansing or purifying, such as in religious practice. 
This thesis advances a novel approach to the human experience of pain as a functional part of our 
social world. Pain is conceptualised with a biopsychosocial approach, in which pain is seen as more 
than nociception. Four key frontiers in the social psychological understanding of pain are broached: 
revisiting how physical pain may relate to the experience of social rejection or ostracism (hurt 
feelings); how social groups can affect our experience of pain; and how sharing pain and enjoyment 
can bring us closer to others in our social world – but may also turn others away. I examine these 
focal areas with a conceptualisation of pain underpinned by the biopsychosocial model, where pain 
can be viewed as an experience that is biological, psychological, and social in nature, and which 
must incorporate these key components to be fulsomely understood.  
In detail, Chapter 1 introduces the thesis with an overview of the literature along with the 
aims and scope of the work. Next Chapter 2 is a theoretical chapter which reviews the literature on 
physical and social pain overlap theory and offers a new synthesis of the relationship between 
physical and social pain. In essence, the overlap concept binds social pain with the tangibility of 
physical pain and promises a unified understanding of pain and suffering. However, fMRI evidence 
now casts doubt on the posited neural basis of overlap. This thesis proposes a conceptualisation of 
pain overlap that reconnects with the principles of a biopsychosocial approach, and supports 
recognition of convergence as well as overlap. By unpacking the antecedents, cognitions, and 
emotions that are associated with each pain, the question of overlap versus difference can be better 
understood.   
Chapters 3 is an empirical examination of how groups can affect our experience of pain. The 
chapter presents the findings of an fMRI study into the impact of social group memberships on the 
experience and communication of pain. This research shows fMRI and behavioural evidence that 
salient group memberships facilitate pain communication. Furthermore, to the extent that people 
reported more pain in response to salient social groups stimuli, we found corresponding changes in 
brain activation in areas associated with pain experience (insula and dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex). This suggests an adaptive response to pain, whereby modulating pain communication in 
line with salient group memberships may produce a relative reduction in pain-associated brain 
activation.   
Chapters 4 and 5 turn the spotlight on pleasure and enjoyment alongside pain. These 
chapters provide field and experimental evidence that sharing pain and enjoyment can help people 
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feel more connected and serve important identity functions by revealing who we are (Chapter 4), 
but that pain and pleasure also invite adverse moral judgements (Chapter 5). Chapter 4 presents the 
findings of a field study at a cold-water mass swim in Tasmania, Australia. Experiencing intense 
pleasure and pain during the swim was associated with larger increases in self-revelation from pre- 
to post-swim, which in turn predicted enhanced identification with others over the course of the 
event. Chapter 5 reports 2 experimental studies with large online samples, in which participants 
made moral judgements about individuals portrayed to be enjoying pain. Targets who enjoyed pain 
were consistently considered less moral and more immoral than no-pain controls. These 
experiments suggest that in unlocking any psychosocial gains from pain and enjoyment, people may 
also need to be wary of observers’ moral judgements. 
In sum, this thesis advances theoretical and empirical understanding of pain; by examining 
how pain may bring benefits, and how pain may influence, and be influenced by, psychosocial 
factors. Within this research lies an important overarching theme: there are many perspectives on 
the phenomenon of pain, and social psychology has an important role to play within the broader 
scientific effort toward understanding pain. 
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On Feeling Hurt: Advances in the Social Psychology of Pain 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Pain: Setting the Stage  
Pain is a primal and familiar experience – whether from injury, child birth, illness; everyday 
occurrences or disasters; and the myriad other sources of painfulness that make up the life of a 
human being. Pain demands our attention, reminds us of our human limitations, and forms the basis 
of much suffering. It also attracts a certain fascination. For millennia, a chorus of human effort has 
sought to trace the features of pain, to give voice to its intricacies, through literature, art, religion, 
science, and philosophy.  
Although pain is common and recognisable as a percept (ouch!), pain is complex (Auvray, 
Myin, & Spence, 2010), and our relationship with it has undergone transformational shifts over the 
centuries (Morris, 1991). Historically the science of pain has been a study of pain mechanism, 
falling largely within the domain of medicine. With Descartes’ famous theorising of the flame-to-
brain pathway (1644; see Bourke, 2012), pain was understood as operating through cause and effect 
mechanisms where pain is an alarm that is directly proportionate to damage to the tissues. This 
understanding of pain served medical science well for centuries, and forms the basis of the concept 
of nociception still in use today (Brooks & Tracey, 2005; Duncan, 2000). Significant progress has 
been made: scientific expansion and refinement of the biological mechanisms of pain has been 
exponential, supporting theoretical and empirical advancements in pain conceptualisation and 
treatment (Julius & Basbaum, 2001).  
Nevertheless, since the mid-20th century, nothing short of a revolution has taken place in 
how pain is conceptualised (Melzack & Katz, 2013; Melzack & Wall, 1965; Moayedi & Davis, 
2013). Most relevantly for this thesis, biomedical developments have been accompanied by a 
growing acknowledgment of the psychosocial dimensions of pain, in addition to its biological 
underpinnings (Fernandez & Turk, 1992; Garland, 2012; Gatchel, Peng, Peters, Fuchs, & Turk, 
2007; Morris, 1991; Price, 2000; Sullivan et al., 2001; A. C. de C. Williams & Craig, 2016). These 
conceptual advances have highlighted the critical role of social psychology with its ontological 
traditions of scientific concern for cognitions, emotions, and behaviours of the individual and 
groups. Social psychological examinations of pain thus represent the forefront of this area of 
research, where much exciting ground is yet to be covered.   
Along these lines, this thesis advances a biopsychosocial approach to the human experience 
of pain. As described further below, the biopsychosocial model originated as a response to the 
biomedical model of illness (Engel, 1977). As a consequence, its application to pain has often been 
in service of ways to better treat pain i.e. to assist those suffering from pain, particularly pain not 
readily encapsulated by medical means (such as chronic or persistent pain, or idiopathic pains: 
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Melzack & Katz, 2013; Melzack & Wall, 1965; Amanda C de C  Williams & Johnson, 2011). 
However, the biopsychosocial model of pain can offer much more – particularly when applied to 
consider the positive functions of pain (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, & Leknes, 2014).  
This thesis therefore places the biopsychosocial theoretical framework into new territory in 
two ways. First, this thesis examines pain as a functional part of our social world. This thesis builds 
on the expansive gains delivered by the biopsychosocial model, by linking with growing evidence 
that pain can be functional; for instance, by bringing people together through adversity, enhancing 
cooperation, coalescing identification with those around us, or allowing us to test our limits 
(Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; Konvalinka et al., 2011; Xygalatas, Konvalinka, Bulbulia, & 
Roepstorff, 2011; Xygalatas et al., 2013). While pain may not always be positive, a biopsychosocial 
approach allows for a conceptual shift where pain is considered functional, including its benefits 
and decrements.  
Second, this thesis places the biopsychosocial model of pain in new territory by examining 
novel topics. These are topics at the heart of social psychological enquiry, such as the impact of 
groups on the individual, and examining the individual within the collective. This thesis particularly 
focuses on social contributions to the dynamics of pain – how pain is fundamentally shaped by the 
psychosocial as well as the biological; how groups affect pain for the individual, and how pain 
affects groups and the individuals within them. Specifically, this includes revisiting how physical 
pain may relate to the experience of social rejection or ostracism (hurt feelings); how salient social 
groups can affect our experience of pain; and how sharing pain and enjoyment can bring us closer 
to others in our social world, but may also turn others away. I examine these focal areas with a 
conceptualisation of pain underpinned by the biopsychosocial model – as an experience that is 
biological, psychological, and social in nature, and which must incorporate all components in order 
to be fulsomely understood.  
In short, this thesis asks a series of questions – what constitutes pain, and can hurt feelings 
rightly be conceptualised as ‘pain’? Can pain be modulated, for instance by making valued social 
groups salient? How is it that pain can sometimes be pleasurable, despite its aversiveness – and 
what are the consequences and implications of this experience? These types of questions cannot be 
answered without considering the psychological, social and biological basis of this complex human 
experience. For this reason, the biopsychosocial model deeply informs this thesis and its aims.  
The next section elaborates on pain definition and measurement, before expanding on the 
biopsychosocial approach to pain in additional detail.   
What Is Pain? Defining and Measuring Pain 
Pain is different to other physical sensations in the body (A. D. Craig, 2003b). The 
International Association for the Study of International Association for the Study of Pain 
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(1994/2016) defines pain as an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual 
or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage. Two key features emerge from 
this understanding of pain: a) the subjective nature of the pain experience, such that pain may be 
experienced in terms of tissue damage but absent actual damage; and b) the delineation of its 
sensory and affective components (Fernandez & Turk, 1992; Price, 2000). This acknowledges pain 
as an emotional and physical experience; one that is private, subjective and context-dependent; and 
one that often corresponds to nociceptive input but need not in order to give rise to painfulness.  
Biological mechanism. Acknowledging that pain may arise through a range of inputs, 
physical pain can be biologically understood as originating through detection and transduction of 
noxious stimuli by nociceptors in the periphery or viscera, with specific and well-characterised 
receptors for mechanical, thermal, chemical and cold pain. Nociceptive input is received in the 
dorsal horn of the spinal cord and relayed supraspinally, preserving distinct sensory qualities 
mapped to the region of detection (Schwarz & Meyer, 2005; Westlund, 2005). Acute physical pain 
is known to spark specific and complex physiological responses, evinced by increased skin 
conductance, faster heart rate, and higher levels of blood cortisol, adrenaline and noradrenaline, 
heralding pain-activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis and the sympathetic nervous 
system (Benarroch & Sandroni, 2005; Pacák & McCarty, 2000). Neuroimaging studies show pain is 
associated with activity in an extensive subcortical and cortical network, referred to as the pain 
matrix (Legrain, Iannetti, Plaghki, & Mouraux, 2011; Melzack, 1999, 2005). This network 
integrates ascending signals and modulates descending feedback, and includes the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex, insula, periaqueductal grey, primary somatosensory cortex and prefrontal cortex 
(C. R. Chapman, 2005; Coghill, McHaffie, & Yen, 2003; Eisenberger, 2012c; Tracey, 2010).  
Predictive biomarkers of the experience of pain are yet to be established, but a graded fMRI 
signature that correlates with subjective pain ratings has been proposed (Wager, Atlas, Lindquist, 
Roy, Woo, & Kross, 2013). The extent to which this and similar biological correlates can presently 
represent multidimensional pain is contested (Miller, 2009), and in some settings, measurement is 
highly controversial (for example, in determining foetal and neonatal pain: Lee, Ralston, Drey, 
Partridge, & Rosen, 2005). Consistent with its complex and subjective nature, pain in clinical 
settings is principally measured through self-report (J. E. Brown, Chatterjee, Younger, & Mackey, 
2011).  
Pain is a sensation and a motivation. Nociception is not synonymous with pain. Craig 
(2003b) explains pain as both an interoceptive state (feeling from the body) and homeostatic 
emotion (affective motivation). In this sense, pain is both a sensation and a complex drive for 
response – like hunger, thirst or itch, rather than touch (see also, Auvray et al., 2010). This dual 
nature of pain means that there is both sensory and motivational impetus to mount complex and 
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adaptive responses that extend beyond simple reflexes (Elwood, Barr, & Patterson, 2009). There are 
powerful evolutionary incentives to favour a suite of potentially targeted adaptive behaviours over a 
limited, unitary, or merely reflexive response. Thus an advantage is conferred upon organisms that 
can experience pain as opposed to simply detecting nociception.   
Pain is socially and culturally informed. Pain is experienced within a sociocultural 
context, and there are diverse cultural understandings of pain (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000; Morris, 
1991). This also means that experiencing pain attracts a plethora of meanings – pain may signal 
damage to tissues, but also may represent change in social status through a rite of passage or 
punishment; symbolising cleansing or purification, such as in religious practice, or impurity or 
tarnishing via unwanted assault; an indication to stop, or a sign to keep going, as in sustained efforts 
such as in a triathlon or marathon. Social information can increase pain, such as the knowledge that 
our pain has been intentionally inflicted by others (Gray & Wegner, 2008). Social support can 
ameliorate pain, such as during childbirth (Hodnett, Gates, Hofmeyr, & Sakala, 2015), or allow us 
to tolerate pain longer (Jones & Jetten, 2011). Sociocultural factors may even influence whether or 
not an experience is deemed pain at all, such as the ‘pain’ associated with eating capsaicin-rich 
cuisine (Rozin, Guillot, Fincher, Rozin, & Tsukayama, 2013; Rozin & Schiller, 1980). Therefore, 
the social element of pain is integral in understanding the pain experience, its sequelae, and its 
functions. 
The Biopsychosocial Model Applied 
As highlighted, this thesis takes the biopsychosocial model as its theoretical foundation 
(Engel, 1977). Now a widely-applied model of transdiagnostic and multidisciplinary significance, it 
was originally proposed as a model of illness. Through this model, the treating practitioner could 
engage with the patient as a ‘whole person’, not merely the measurable biomedical facets of patient 
disease (Borrell-Carrio, Suchman, & Epstein, 2004). Critically, this model was proposed as an 
antidote to the very real potential for reductionism and dehumanisation arising from a biomedical 
frame. Therefore, a biopsychosocial approach meant seeing patients as more than their symptoms – 
while still recognising and capitalising upon the considerable progress in the treatment of illness 
delivered by biomedical scientific advances (Gatchel et al., 2007).  
Of course, the present work is not the first to take a biopsychosocial approach to pain (see, 
for example, Fordyce, 1976; Fordyce, Fowler, & DeLateur, 1968; Gatchel et al., 2007; 
Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2012; A. C. de C. Williams & Craig, 2016). However, this 
thesis takes up this approach augmented with the theoretical understandings afforded by the social 
psychological tradition, to consider where pain may be functional for individuals and groups (i.e. 
possessing functions or serving purposes well beyond those envisaged by a purely ‘illness’ frame). 
This allows a broader examination of the benefits and decrements associated with pain (Bastian, 
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Jetten, Hornsey, et al., 2014; Leknes & Bastian, 2014). And as stated earlier, this thesis also 
advances pain research in new directions by taking up the biopsychosocial approach with a critical 
eye into previously under-studied corners of pain. Specifically, this thesis critically considers how 
the biopsychosocial model has paved the way for the field to conceptualise rejection and ostracism 
as categories of pain. This thesis uses a biopsychosocial understanding of pain to examine how 
social group memberships can shape how we experience and communicate pain. This thesis also 
broaches the notion of pleasure with pain, and its psychosocial costs and dividends from the 
perspective of partaker and observer. Each of these research directions is briefly introduced in the 
following passages.   
‘Social’ Pain 
The concept of pain as a sensory and emotional experience – one that may not be associated 
with tissue damage – means that parallels can be drawn between ‘feeling hurt’ and ‘hurt feelings’. 
Seminal research has highlighted commonalities between the experience of social pain 
(interpersonal rejection, ostracism, and hurt feelings) and physical pain (Herman & Panksepp, 1978; 
MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Panksepp, Herman, Conner, Bishop, & Scott, 1978). Over subsequent 
decades, researchers further considered how these two experiences may be similar, with particular 
attention directed to uncovering overlap in neural activation patterns in the brain (Eisenberger, 
2008, 2012b, 2012c; Eisenberger, 2015; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, Lieberman, 
& Williams, 2003; Kross, Berman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011). Neural evidence of overlap 
offers a biological index of similarity, potentially even substantiating the view that social and 
physical pain are the same construct at a biological level. However, this thesis argues that such a 
conceptualisation of social and physical pain is unsustainable when psychosocial components of 
pain are considered (such as pain antecedents, pain-related emotions and cognitions, and post-pain 
behaviours). In short, this is because biological indices alone reduce pain to a discrete biochemical 
event rather than a subjective phenomenological experience with psychosocial components in tow; 
and consideration of these psychosocial domains points to differences rather than similarities. The 
broken heart undoubtedly hurts, but the heart is not truly broken. By considering a contextualised 
notion of pain – i.e. encapsulating biological indices as well as where pain originated, pain 
cognitions and affect, and behavioural responses to pain – we can get to a more comprehensive 
analysis of each pain and understand their differences as well as similarities. 
Communicating Pain 
Even though pain is an internal experience, intimately unknowable, Glucklich (2003) points 
out, ‘[i]t is inconceivable that the suffering of Christ on the cross, or the astounding martyrdom of 
the saints, or that of Rabbi Akiva or Al-Hallaj, would mean anything to anyone unless pain was 
intrinsically shareable.’ (p. 63). Even though pain is a private, interoceptive experience (Scarry, 
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1985), it also occurs within a sociocultural context. This context can influence the frequency and 
duration of pain exposure, cognitions and emotions about pain, and how we communicate pain 
(Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011; A. C. de C. Williams & Craig, 2016). Pain communication may be 
instinctual or reflexive, such as physical withdrawal from noxious stimuli, pain vocalisation, or 
facial expression. Conveying pain may also be agentic and transactional, in order to draw the 
attention of others to our circumstances (Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011).  
In addition, the social ‘resources’ we have at our disposal when in pain appear to influence 
how pain is experienced. Based on the social identity tradition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), valued 
social group memberships represent psychosocial resources that meet fundamental psychological 
needs and which may be called upon in times of need (Greenaway, Cruwys, Haslam, & Jetten, 
2015; S. A. Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; S. Alexander Haslam, O'Brien, Jetten, 
Vormedal, & Penna, 2005; Iyer, Jetten, Tsivrikos, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; Jetten et al., 2015). 
This means that the salience of social group memberships can also be expected to change how we 
experience and communicate pain itself (Jones & Jetten, 2011).  
In short, communicating pain can allow us to connect to the psychosocial resources we may 
have at our disposal to alleviate the aversiveness of pain. Making valued group memberships salient 
may be one way to mobilise these resources, i.e. to elicit pain communication in ways that might 
alleviate pain. This thesis aims to investigate this proposal empirically. By shining a light on the 
social dynamics surrounding pain, this line of research demonstrates how the biopsychosocial 
approach can be utilised to better understand how pain is modulated.  
Sharing Pain – and Pleasure  
Sharing pain is an intriguing human practice. From a basic evolutionary perspective, the 
putative function of pain is to capture attentional resources and mobilise action to defend threats or 
damage to bodily integrity (A. D. Craig, 2003b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001). If pain signals threat and damage, then it follows that avoiding pain is also an 
important survival tactic: pain’s inherent aversiveness ostensibly implies that human beings will 
always seek to avoid it.  
But evidence from cultural, social, and clinical psychology; anthropology; and sociology – 
not to mention everyday anecdotal experience – readily tells us this is not so (Baumeister, 
1989/2014; Bentley, Nock, & Barlow, 2014; Franklin, Puzia, et al., 2013; Nock, 2010; Richert, 
Whitehouse, & Stewart, 2005; Whitehouse, 1996). Pain may be sought out for social, cultural, or 
religious reasons (Bridel, 2010; Glucklich, 2003; Mann, Feddes, Doosje, & Fischer, 2015; 
Xygalatas et al., 2011; Xygalatas et al., 2013), or even simply to alleviate boredom (Wilson et al., 
2014).   
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Psychosocial benefits. Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al. (2014) have persuasively argued that 
engaging with pain is important in unlocking other benefits beyond threat management. They 
suggest that pain facilitates pleasure; enables self-regulation; and promotes social bonding; and 
argue that a host of psychosocial benefits may remain obscured or be only partially realised if we 
only focus on maximising pleasure and avoiding pain. Thus, engaging in pain together may be one 
way to access these gains. Indeed, the popularity of collective painful practices, such as cold swims, 
marathons, and physical challenge events, suggests a side to pain and even enjoyment that is worthy 
of additional scientific scrutiny. Sharing pain collectively with others promotes cooperation and 
prosociality (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; Xygalatas et al., 2013). Collective enjoyment and 
pleasure also binds groups together – referred to as collective effervescence or communitas 
(Durkheim, 1912/1995; Páez, Rimé, Basabe, Wlodarczyk, & Zumeta, 2015; E. Turner, 2012; V. W. 
Turner, 1969/2008). However, the implications of collective pleasure and pain together have been 
less clear. When pain is pleasurable, are these collective effects retained, and what might be the 
mechanism? Fredrickson (2000) has proposed that peak emotional experiences can provide us with 
particularly fertile ground for self-knowledge and meaning (see also Whitehouse, 2012). In 
application, this suggests that intense collective experiences involving pleasure and pain may 
provide a salient foundation for self-knowledge and revelation as well as connection with others. In 
its fourth chapter, this thesis examines how pleasure may have a part to play in how such painful 
practices benefit participants – specifically, whether collective pleasure and pain together delivers 
these benefits. 
Moral judgements. The previous section describes social benefits (e.g. group binding) 
associated with pleasurable pain, which could well lead one to believe that pleasurable pain is 
desirable as a means to access shared experiences that are rich in meaning and psychosocial benefit. 
However, it is important to consider the sociocultural context in which these practices and 
experiences take place. How do others regard those who engage in these experiences? There is 
ample evidence that pleasurable pain is considered unfavourably by others, but little quantitative 
work to specifically measure moral judgements when pain and pleasure are manipulated. Moral 
judgements associated with pain enjoyment are understudied, despite pain enjoyment being an 
interesting case in which the moral dyad of agent and patient arguably resides within the one entity.  
Literary treatment of pain enjoyment has traditionally invoked themes of sub-culture 
sexuality, particularly deviance and perversion (Allen, 2003; von Sacher-Masoch, 1870/2000). 
Qualitative evidence from anthropological and sociological fields also points to this notion of 
dissidence and ‘otherness’ (Baumeister, 1989/2014; Taylor & Ussher, 2001), even though actual 
prevalence is relatively common (Joyal & Carpentier, 2017). In his works on sexual masochism, 
Baumeister (1989/2014) noted the need for psychological efforts to understand the phenomenon of 
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masochism ‘on the basis of common principles in the behaviour of normal people’, rather than as a 
pathology or deviance (p. x). This thesis aims to unpack moral judgements about those who engage 
in pleasurable pain, from the perspective of the observer.  
In sum, this thesis considers social exclusion with relevance to pain, the effect of valued 
groups on the experience of pain, the consequences of collective pain enjoyment, and the moral 
judgements of others concerning this form of benign masochism. Guiding these examinations is the 
theoretical framework of the biopsychosocial approach to pain. In the following section, the thesis 
is briefly overviewed by chapter.  
Thesis Overview  
As noted, this thesis brings a biopsychosocial approach to consider pain as a functional part 
of our social world. This is done in four substantive chapters – one theoretical chapter, and three 
chapters presenting empirical research, each described as follows.  
In Chapter 2, the biopsychosocial approach is deployed to deliver a new theoretical analysis 
of the relationship between social and physical pain. For decades, empirical evidence has been 
mounting that social pain shares key elements with physical pain, such as shared neurochemistry 
and even neural overlap. Connecting experiences of ostracism, social rejection and hurt feelings 
with physical pain has in many ways substantiated the experience of social pain in ‘medical’ terms. 
However, recent neural findings have cast doubt on the notion that the two experiences do indeed 
share neural overlap (Cacioppo et al., 2013; Woo et al., 2014). These developments make it 
essential for the field to reconsider what is to be gained by comparisons to physical pain, and what 
constitutes ‘overlap’. To meet this need, this chapter presents a reconceptualisation of social and 
physical pain overlap research and makes suggestions to guide the field in moving forward. 
Ultimately, the experience of social exclusion does not need to be compared with physical pain to 
demonstrate its veracity as a psychological phenomenon.            
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present empirical work. These chapters focus on physical pain within 
the social world. Chapter 3 examines the experience and communication of pain in the context of 
salient social groups, with a laboratory study incorporating fMRI and self-report methodologies. 
From an evolutionary perspective, eliciting social support is an adaptive response to pain: social 
support reduces physical pain, and multiple group salience improves pain tolerance (J. L. Brown, 
Sheffield, Leary, & Robinson, 2003; Jones & Jetten, 2011). Communicating pain to others is a 
crucial step in securing that social support (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; A. C. Williams, 2002). 
Therefore, it is important to understand how apparent social resources affect how pain is 
experienced and communicated. This study showed that participants reported higher levels of pain 
when more groups were salient. Furthermore, when participants modulated their pain reports 
according to the number of salient groups, a corresponding relative difference in brain activation 
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was revealed. This suggests pain communication as an adaptive response to pain in line with 
fluctuations in salient social resources.   
Chapter 4 examines collective painful practices in vivo with a field study involving 
participants undertaking a cold-water mass swim. Consistent with the notion that shared pain 
promotes social bonding (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014), participants showed significantly higher 
levels of social identification after than before the swim. Contrary to previous evidence of pain and 
pleasure as a form of self-escape (Baumeister, 1988, 1989/2014), this study found that intense 
pleasure and pain predicted a greater increase in self-revelation, in turn predicting positive change 
in social identification over the course of the swim.  
Chapter 5 then provides an empirical examination of how pain enjoyment is perceived by 
others, in particular focusing on moral judgments of observers concerning pain enjoyment. With 2 
large-sample studies, this chapter empirically documents the impoverished moral status of those 
depicted enjoying pain. Together, this thesis is concerned with advancing a social psychology of 
pain through theoretical and empirical research contributions. On pain, there is still a great deal to 
discover, and compelling reason to do so.     
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Chapter 2  
 
Social and physical pain overlap has excited controversy and receives considerable research 
attention. Although pain overlap research has revealed important insights – linking social pain to 
the relative tangibility of physical pain, and highlighting the qualities of the pain experience 
(qualia) that feature in both pains – it is now time for critical reflection. There is much to be gained 
by considering psychological factors beyond these pain qualia, such as pain source; thoughts and 
emotions relating to pain; and behavioural responses to pain. Drawing these factors into a 
contextualised model of pain is critical to understanding what pain means and how people respond 
to it, and is necessary to bring the field back in step with a biopsychosocial approach to pain. While 
a lover’s rejection may feel like a slap in the face, we must look past the metaphor to reach a more 
comprehensive psychological analysis of social and physical pain.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 is the manuscript in revision: 
Ferris, L. J., et al. (in revision). Feeling hurt: Revisiting the relationship between social and 
physical pain. Personality and Social Psychology Review. 
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Feeling hurt: Revisiting the relationship between social and physical pain 
 The physical embodiment of emotional suffering is an enduring symbol. Describing 
emotional pain in physical terms confers tangibility and corporeality, and there are countless 
examples in philosophy, literature and religion that bear witness to the association (see MacDonald 
& Leary, 2005 for review; Morris, 1991). The ‘heartache’ we experience from the severance of a 
relationship is real, painful, and it hurts.  
The notion that these two types of pain represent overlapping states of painfulness is an 
intuitively powerful progression on this theme. In the last decade there has been a strong push to 
understand how these pains might be interconnected (see Eisenberger, 2012a, for a review). 
Striking instances of functional crossover effects have been empirically described, including reports 
that analgesics can reduce social pain (DeWall et al., 2010; Herman & Panksepp, 1978; cf Durso, 
Luttrell, & Way, 2015), and that social support can reduce physical pain (J. L. Brown et al., 2003; 
Master et al., 2009). Furthermore, trait sensitivity to physical pain is linked with sensitivity to social 
pain (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006), and variations in pain receptors predict 
dispositional sensitivity to social pain (mu-opioid gene receptor polymorphism; Way, Taylor, & 
Eisenberger, 2009). 
Thinking about social and physical pain as overlapping constructs promises a rich and 
unifying theoretical understanding of human pain and suffering. Overlap is consistent with modern 
conceptions of pain as a subjective unpleasant experience, in which objective nociception may be 
present but is not required. Examining overlap has thereby brought commonalities into sharp focus. 
These commonalities link social pain to the relative tangibility of physical pain, giving prominence 
to the qualities of the pain experience that arise in both pains.  
However, we see opportunities to broaden the investigation of physical and social pain by 
going beyond the experience of pain per se to examine a more complex suite of psychological 
factors. This broader analysis shines a light on other aspects of pain, and factors surrounding pain, 
which speak to separation and overlap – and which can reveal much more about pain itself. In what 
follows we review the current state of play for the literature on pain overlap, and put forth a basis 
for the contextualisation of pain. This means returning into the frame information about where pain 
has come from, thoughts and emotions related to why pain is happening and its meaning, and 
behaviours surrounding painfulness. We present a series of illustrative examples that hint at 
difference rather than commonality, implying that an overlap frame can limit the scope of inquiry 
and inadvertently gloss over psychological overlays that add to the conceptual diversity of pain in 
important ways.  
Before beginning our review, we want to make clear that it is not the purpose of this chapter 
to stipulate where overlap lies, or to quantify the extent to which pain overlap exists.  Nor is it about 
 12 
establishing boundary conditions of pain overlap. Rather, we identify the need for a reframing of 
the field’s approach: away from examining pain qualia alone to an approach that places more focus 
on the antecedents of pain, and its affective, cognitive and behavioural implications (i.e., a 
contextualised approach). Thinking about pain as more than qualia allows for a genuinely 
biopsychosocial approach, one that provides an opportunity for new hypotheses to be tested, and for 
differences between social and physical pain to be illuminated.     
What is Pain? ‘Hurt Feelings’ and Feeling Hurt 
Conventional medical notions of pain focused on specificity and positioned pain as a 
phenomenon arising solely via mechanistic stimulation of receptors in the periphery. René 
Descartes’ enduring image of the flame as pain burns its path from foot to brain (or from body to 
mind) famously symbolises the bodily machinery of pain from injury-event to painful experience 
(Bourke, 2012). With the pain-as-nociception model, those pains without an apparent mechanistic 
aetiology become relegated to ‘somatization’ (Crombez, Beirens, Van Damme, Eccleston, & 
Fontaine, 2009), ‘psychogenic pain’, or in earlier days, hysteria (Cope, 2009); and the lived 
experience of the person in pain was obscured.   
The shift away from a pain-as-nociception model was catalyzed by Melzack and Wall’s 
(1965) gate control theory. This allowed the development of a model of pain in which the brain is 
an operative component with capacity for descending control of pain inputs, and with psychological 
factors incorporated as more than mere reactions to pain. Since this turning point, theorists have 
increasingly recognised that pain can be better understood by looking beyond nociception alone (for 
instance in cases of chronic pain, phantom limb pain, and other idiopathic pain syndromes; Biro, 
2010). It is now widely recognised that pain is a complex, private and subjective experience that is 
not necessarily contingent on the presence of nociceptive input (Melzack & Katz, 2013): an 
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or 
described in terms of such damage (International Association for the Study of Pain Taskforce on 
Taxonomy  (IASP), 1994/ 2014). At its most famously inclusive, pain is ‘…whatever the 
experiencing person says it is, existing whenever the person says it does’ (McCaffery, 1968; cited in 
McCaffery & Beebe, 1994, p. 15). Accordingly, if social pain hurts, then it is pain. This is a 
controversial premise, but one that opened up possibilities to consider the overlap between social 
and physical pain.  
Contemporary pain theory supports a model of pain with two components: sensory and 
affective (IASP, 1994/2014). In their landmark paper, MacDonald and Leary (2005) characterised 
social pain as pain affect, suggesting that ‘…the aversive emotional state of social pain is the same 
unpleasantness that is experienced in response to physical pain.’ (p. 203). They traced the substance 
of pain overlap across psychological, evolutionary, and neurological domains, and point to the 
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prevalence of linguistic metaphors describing social pain as physically painful: feeling ‘crushed’, 
‘wounded’, ‘emotionally scarred’ or like getting ‘a slap in the face’ (p. 206). With echoes of 
Bentham’s (1789/1907) classification of various pains and their kinds, Lieberman and Eisenberger 
(2009) espouse a wide view of what pain might include, suggesting that ‘[f]or every state of 
deprivation associated with a particular need, there is a pain. Lack of food begets hunger, lack of 
water begets thirst, and lack of shelter begets thermal discomfort. Each of these pains motivates us 
to seek out the salve that will take the pain away and satisfy the underlying need’ (p. 891). This 
broad conceptualisation permits the idea that overlap could lie beyond mere unpleasantness (see 
also Kross et al., 2011), and that various sources of pain might conceptually overlap simply by 
virtue of being painful.   
From an evolutionary perspective, the origin of overlap is founded on humans’ fundamental 
need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and the effectiveness of pain as a threat-signal for 
directing attention and marshaling resources to cope (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). Predecessors 
who were able to detect, respond to or prevent social exclusion were arguably better positioned to 
avoid the risks to survival that rejection would bring. Hurt feelings would therefore provide the 
signal and the impetus to adaptively and appropriately respond to social injury (K. D. Williams, 
2007a), just as physical pain flags risks to physical integrity and drives a response (A. D. Craig, 
2003b). This provides an evolutionary explanation for why emotional suffering might be adaptive 
following exclusion, and for why physical and social pain would present as similarly ‘hurtful’. 
Eisenberger (2015) has reiterated that the affective distress arising from both types of pain is 
what binds them together. Specifically, the critical common experiential element is said to lie in the 
affective component of pain (p. 621). At a basic level, looking for overlap in the affective 
component is consistent with the absence of a sensory peripheral mechanism for social pain (Papini, 
Fuchs, & Torres, 2015). Isolating the affective and sensory components of pain in order to 
understand what aspects overlap is also intuitively appealing (Eisenberger, 2015), and may alleviate 
the issue of perceptual overlap being incongruent with lived experience – ostensibly, one “knows” 
that a broken toe is different to a breakup because of sensory differences, so it is the affective 
component of distress that links the two experiences together. 
But what then is the specific substrate or mechanism of pain overlap? With this question the 
literature reaches a critical juncture. Over more than a decade, Eisenberger and colleagues provided 
theoretical and experimental support for a common neural substrate for social and physical pain, 
comprising dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and other key regions (Eisenberger, 2015; 
Eisenberger, 2012a; Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003; see also Kross, 
Breman, Mischel, Smith, & Wager, 2011). This body of evidence gave weight to the promise of a 
mechanistic explanation for overlap (Panksepp, 2003), where social pain is mapped onto physical 
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pain signaling systems and operates through putatively shared neurochemistry and brain activation 
patterns (Eisenberger, 2012a, 2012c). In its furthest extension, neurological overlap was posited as a 
neat explanation for crossover modulation of the pain experience, because ‘…to the extent that 
physical and social pain rely on similar neural systems, factors, such as social support, that 
downregulate one type of pain (social pain) should also downregulate other types of pain 
(physical)’ (Eisenberger, 2008, p. 189).  
However, after a decade of consistent advocacy for neurological pain overlap, a shift in the 
literature appears to be underway. A comprehensive meta-analysis by Cacioppo et al. (2013) 
reexamined existing social pain and physical pain fMRI data, seeking to address concerns about 
small sample sizes, and failed to find support for the assertion that the experience of social pain 
(ostracism) mirrors the proposed physical pain signature. Next, Iannetti, Salomons, Moayedi, 
Mouraux, and Davis (2013) detailed concerns with the logical foundations of fMRI-based overlap, 
suggesting that the prevailing evidence of co-activation lacked the specificity to distinguish pain 
from other categories of stimuli (see also Poldrack, 2006), and therefore could not of itself provide 
evidence of shared neural regions specific to pain. They suggested that the observed patterns of 
activation might not be exclusive to social or physical pain experiences but rather to multiple salient 
categories of stimuli, for instance, stimuli broadly pertaining to threat (see also Iannetti & Mouraux, 
2011; Legrain et al., 2011). Furthermore, Iannetti et al. (2013) raised the possibility that perceptual 
differences in the experiences of social and physical pain could be better characterised with novel 
neuroimaging analysis techniques (e.g., Wager et al., 2013).  
Now recent findings offer empirical evidence of separate neural representations of physical 
pain and social pain. Woo et al. (2014) used multivariate fMRI analysis techniques and drew on 
pre-existing datasets from Kross et al. (2011) and Wager et al. (2013). They specifically tested for 
overlap in the activation of neuronal subpopulations within posited regions of broader anatomical 
overlap, and found distinct neural patterns of activation at this level of analysis. Woo and 
colleagues assert that ‘claims about shared representation in the previous studies have been based 
on findings of overlapping univariate fMRI activity between pain and rejection, which is not 
anatomically specific enough to bear on the question of whether the underlying neural 
representations are similar’ (p. 6). These findings give cause for reflection on the proposed nature of 
pain overlap, and further analysis and debate continues (Eisenberger, 2015; Rotge et al., 2015).  
However, this also provides a window of opportunity to shift the parameters of the 
discussion. In taking stock, some perspectives on the shared neural substrates of social and physical 
pain have specifically raised the question of whether the search for pain overlap has been overly 
narrative-driven (Cacioppo et al., 2013; Iannetti et al., 2013). Thinking about pain overlap in terms 
of neural substrates has produced novel conceptions of ‘hurt feelings’, but recent developments 
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show there is still more to be learned in understanding how social and physical pain interrelate and 
the substance of their proposed interconnectedness. Looking back, the original integrative 
perspective envisaged a range of domains for overlap, exploring ‘convergence between the two 
types of pain in thought, emotion and behaviour’ (MacDonald & Leary, 2005, p. 202). This 
foundational work advocated for similarity, but still advised further research into ‘discrepancies’ in 
the integrative narrative along multiple domains (MacDonald & Leary, 2005, p. 217). However, 
nearly ten years on, researchers have tended to focus on shared qualities of the pain experience, and 
have addressed questions relating to similarities and differences along other domains much less 
vigorously (cf, for example, Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008; Riva, Wesselmann, Wirth, 
Carter-Sowell, & Williams, 2014; Riva, Williams, & Gallucci, 2014; Riva, Wirth, & Williams, 
2011; discussed further below). 
At this juncture we see a compelling rationale to reframe the approach with a contextualised 
notion of pain in mind. The arc of the literature shows a notion of pain that is being increasingly 
constrained by the focus on the feeling of pain. Moving beyond this focus on feeling, we seek to 
return to an understanding of pain that encompasses its psychological context; such as appraisal, 
attributions, affect, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours, that contribute to meaning making and which 
form the basis of much psychological theorizing (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000; Gray & Wegner, 
2008; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Moseley & Arntz, 2007; C. L. Park & Folkman, 1997; Tomaka, 
Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997). This will better reflect the current biopsychosocial 
understanding of pain itself.  
In the next section we delineate some definitional points, then proceed to three key 
foundations for contextualisation: pain antecedents; cognitions and affect; and behaviour. These 
illustrate that when pain is contextualised, a range of similarities and differences can come to the 
fore, and this yields a more comprehensive analysis of social and physical pain. 
Antecedents: Looking at the Source of Pain  
In this chapter we use the terms ‘physical’ and ‘social’ pain to differentiate pain on the basis 
of its source. This provides a workable but imperfect way to describe and delineate these two pains, 
because labeling pain based on its origin is controversial. The IASP definition of pain specifically 
seeks to avoid yoking pain to a stimulus: pain is always a psychological state, and not necessarily 
proportionate to nociception (IASP, 1994/2014). Modern pain theory eschews the idea that pain 
needs a physical cause in order to be ‘real’. Accordingly it is considered loaded discourse to label a 
pain that is felt in the body as physical: tautological at best (“all pain is physically experienced”) 
and a misnomer at worst (“only physical pain is real pain”). A phenomenological approach to pain 
aims to address these tensions and proposes that all pain subjectively felt is pain. This unties pain 
from any particular stimulus or objective cause and situates pain as a product of the brain (Melzack 
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& Katz, 2013). Importantly, this also clears the path for different pain types to be brought together 
conceptually on the basis of overlap in subjective experience – because subjectively, these pains 
could feel the same.   
Yet psychologically, we argue, pain source still matters. It is a necessary and frequently 
touted reminder that a heart attack is very different to the experience of a lover’s rejection; a broken 
heart is not actually broken. There are important differences between social and physical pain. 
Iannetti et al. (2013) suggest that these differences are perceptual and that the two pains are readily 
distinguished by reference to how they feel to the person undergoing the experience – social pain 
presents as emotional distress, while physical pain is experienced as a sensory and emotional 
phenomenon. However, this proposes that social pain and physical pain are distinguishable because 
they feel different, and the two experiences continue to be delineated simply by virtue of the feeling 
alone. This makes an empirical resolution elusive, because subjectively, if these pains actually do 
feel the same, then they are the same.  
We propose that even if social pain and physical pain feel the same, these two pains are 
psychologically and conceptually inseparable from their antecedents. MacDonald and Leary (2005) 
describe social pain as ‘…a specific emotional reaction to the perception that one is being excluded 
from desired relationships or being devalued by desired relationship partners or groups.’ (p. 202).  
Social pain is of itself the appreciation of a shift in one’s relational value in the eyes of others, and 
the social dimension of social pain must be retained to make sense of it. It is precisely the 
realization that one has been rejected by another which creates hurt feelings; by definition, in order 
to feel social pain, one must have a perception of the social context in which the relational 
transaction triggering distress has taken place.  
The antecedents of social pain differentiate it from physical pain in essential ways, because 
what has triggered pain categorically alters the psychological nature of pain. Even if social and 
physical pain subjectively feel the same, or simply share a common experiential element, social 
pain necessarily prompts a different recalculation of our social world and our position within it – 
and this distinction from physical pain is psychologically important. This is because information 
about the source of pain is part of the situational milieu that informs how we then go on to 
experience, appraise, and respond to pain (Benedetti, Thoen, Blanchard, Vighetti, & Arduino, 2013; 
Gray & Wegner, 2008; Moseley & Arntz, 2007). Taking up a contextualised model of pain provides 
a clearer view of these pain precursors, by situating the pain experience and taking account of 
contributory factors. We suggest this analysis provides a better starting point in providing a 
comprehensive psychology of both types of pain. 
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Pain, Cognition and Affect: Pain is Not a Passive Percept 
We also propose that the focus on experiential qualities or ‘qualia’ overlap places additional 
limitations beyond the question of where pain has come from. Dennett (1988) described qualia in 
terms of ‘corralling the quicksilver’, saying that ‘‘[q]ualia’ is an unfamiliar term for something that 
could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us.’ (p. 42)1. Much of the pain 
overlap literature has focused on these qualities of the pain-state, and how this experience may be 
common across pain types.  
However, focusing on the pain-state means there is a risk of overlooking cognitive and 
affective processes surrounding pain. Looking back, conventional perspectives on pain captured 
cognitive and emotional dimensions of pain as mere reactions to pain, rather than components of it 
(Melzack, 1999; Melzack & Katz, 2013). More recent notions treat pain affect as more than just a 
reaction to pain – it is now considered a critical constituent of pain. Bringing psychological 
dimensions like pain affect into the circle as constituents of pain has elevated their status as 
functionally significant components of painfulness (see for example, Fernandez & Turk, 1992; 
Price, 2000). However, a thorough analysis must also look to account for psychological processes 
beyond the experience, and not simply those processes viewed as constituting it in a strict sense.  
This is because fixing upon similarities in the experience of painfulness runs the risk of 
making pain a passive percept, inadvertently diminishing pain to a feeling passively felt. Such an 
approach obscures an important psychological overlay that adds richness to how pain can be 
understood. These are the thoughts and emotions underpinning how we anticipate, emotionally 
react to, consciously reflect upon and conceptualise pain: the role of affect, pain appraisal, 
attribution, and beliefs and attitudes that contribute to meaning making (for example, Benedetti et 
al., 2013; Gray & Wegner, 2008; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Moseley & Arntz, 2007; Tomaka et 
al., 1997). Contextualising pain simply means bringing these externalities back into the frame – 
keeping critical psychological factors within scope.  
Empirical work that responds to this need is emerging. Research has examined memory for, 
and temporal projections of, social and physical pain. This has shown that past social pain is more 
readily and intensely relived than past physical pain (Chen et al., 2008; Meyer, Williams, & 
Eisenberger, 2015), and imagined future social pain is more intensely experienced than future 
physical pain (Chen & Williams, 2012). Other efforts have reached further beyond the pain 
experience to examine the psychological consequences of pain. For instance, Riva et al. (2011) 
examined the effects of social and physical pain on self-reported needs satisfaction (self-esteem, 
belonging, control and meaningful existence), desire to aggress, negative affect and feelings of 
                                                        
1 Notably, Dennett went on to argue for the non-existence of qualia – a debate with which we do not 
engage here. 
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ostracism (Study 2). They report that social and physical pain both decrease overall needs 
satisfaction; and both increase desire to aggress, negative affect, and feelings of being ignored and 
excluded (compared to control treatments). However, direct comparison showed that social and 
physical pain triggered a different profile of responses along these measures: social pain was 
significantly more damaging than physical pain on overall needs satisfaction, sense of belonging, 
meaningful existence, and feelings of ostracism. Social and physical pain, it would seem, can each 
produce a different profile of psychological consequences.  
Critically, these differences are observed when considering thoughts and emotions 
surrounding pain rather than focusing on similarities in the pain experience itself. This provides 
early confirmation that opportunities exist to expand our approach to social and physical pain in 
psychological terms. As an example of this potential, one might consider the psychological 
contribution of meaning-making about pain, and how accounting for this cognitive process could 
give greater theoretical depth to the analysis of pain overlap. Making meaning about pain is a meta-
product of pain cognition that can reframe future pain and contribute to ‘a shared social and 
linguistic culture of pain’ (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000, p. 1632). Meaning-making may be seen as an 
avenue for cognitive agency, of immense value where control and dominion over one’s own pain-
state may seem distant. In looking at everyday pain, Aldrich and Eccleston (2000) offer a concept 
of physical pain as a culturally embedded phenomenon, and put forward eight clusters of meaning 
for pain derived from a qualitative Q-factor exploration of everyday pain. Physical pain is shown to 
represent multiple constellations of meaning, from ‘pain-as-self-growth’ to ‘pain-as-abuse’. 
Critically, their analysis shows that everyday physical pain can present as a singular phenomenon 
but is the basis for diverse clusters of meaning. This highlights the possibility for a spectrum of 
meanings not only within, but between, pain types: the meanings ascribed to social pain may be 
worlds apart from meaning-making about physical pain, or may share important common ground.   
By way of a further example, an extensive literature exists on the role of cognitive and 
affective factors in modulating physical pain, which hints at the possibility for deeper comparative 
work. For instance, fear and expectation, attentional set and mood all contribute to physical pain 
magnitude: anticipating low painfulness can reduce reported pain (Koyama, McHaffie, Laurienti, & 
Coghill, 2005), as can prior attentional set toward non-pain tasks (Van Ryckeghem, Crombez, 
Eccleston, Legrain, & Van Damme, 2013) or positive mood (Villemure & Bushnell, 2009; 
Villemure, Slotnick, & Bushnell, 2003). Experimentally-induced depressed mood heightens the 
unpleasantness of physical pain (Berna et al., 2010). Placebo and nocebo effects for physical pain 
are well documented (see Tracey, 2010, for review). Fear of pain and catastrophization amplify 
painfulness (Campbell & Edwards, 2009; Sullivan et al., 2001). Significant work has been done to 
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explore the role of fear (see Crombez, Eccleston, Van Damme, Vlaeyen, & Karoly, 2012 for 
review) and catastrophizing (Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995) in the transition toward chronic pain.  
Notably, a comparable literature along these domains for social pain has not coalesced; and 
how social and physical pain might compare across each of these elements is yet to be explored. 
However, there are instances of empirical and theoretical work (Riva, Wesselmann, et al., 2014; 
Riva, Williams, et al., 2014). For example, comparing fear of social and physical pain, Riva, 
Williams, et al. (2014) examined crossover in fear of physical and social ‘threat’ with the 
development of the Fear of Social Threat Scale (based on  the Fear of Pain Questionnaire; McNeil 
& Rainwater, 1998). They report the existence of two discrete fear constructs that are positively 
correlated, suggesting support for qualified convergence of fear type (Study 1). However, each fear 
type uniquely predicted perceptions of the corresponding pain: in Study 2, fear of social threat 
uniquely predicted ratings of social distress from ostracism in Cyberball, while in Study 3, fear of 
physical pain uniquely predicted pain ratings of subsequent physical pain. This shows that there are 
commonalities (i.e. crossover in fear of both pain types), but by looking beneath this veneer, 
differences emerge, and this adds depth to our understanding of how pain and fear interrelate. 
Moreover, this early work demonstrates how we can begin to consider similarities and differences 
across new domains: by applying a contextualised approach to pain, the horizons for inquiry are 
considerably broadened – and this promises a richer understanding of both pains as a result. 
In sum, pockets of empirical and theoretical work are emerging but there remains more to be 
done. Specifically, there are promising literatures on pain meaning-making and  other cognitive-
affective modulators of physical pain, but the extent and nature of overlap between social and 
physical pain along these and other lines remains largely untested. Above, we have provided 
illustrative findings on the cognitive and affective dimensions of pain within pain types, but these 
examples hint at the range of comparative opportunities where similarities and differences between 
pain types can be examined. Applied more broadly, a contextualised approach to pain can 
reinvigorate inquiry into social and physical pain that specifically extends over and above their 
common experiential elements. We  advocate further examination of social pain and physical pain 
along cognitive and affective dimensions, as part of the potential contribution of the contextualised 
approach to pain we propose.  
Responding to Pain: Others and Self 
So far we have canvassed the issues associated with overlap largely within the confines of 
the internal world – qualia, thoughts, emotions. We turn now to look at behavioural responses to 
pain. Key theories about the evolutionary origin and functions of pain rely on pain’s ability to 
motivate a response – such as instigating withdrawal or avoidance to mitigate bodily damage or 
escape death; or producing facial expressions of pain as a signal to others (A. C. Williams, 2002). 
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We anticipate that contextualised pain promises better explanatory value for these and other post-
pain behaviours. As discussed earlier, contextualising pain means considering where pain has come 
from, why pain has occurred, what it means to be experiencing it, whether it is considered a threat 
or a positive challenge, whether it has occurred before and whether it is likely to happen again – 
each of which may underpin how a person behaviourally responds to pain. If pain is not placed 
within its psychological context, factors that might explain the processes underlying behaviour will 
reside outside the frame.  
Next, we highlight three examples that illustrate the theoretical limits of the overlap 
metaphor and the prevailing focus on qualia overlap relating to behavioural responses to pain. Our 
first two examples draw on evolutionary approaches to pain, and Craig’s (2003b) model of pain as a 
homeostatic emotion. The third example draws from the social pain literature to examine socio-
behavioural (interpersonal) responses. 
Pain motivates adaptive responses. First, linking pains on the basis of shared qualia may 
be problematic from an evolutionary perspective. The putative function of pain is to signal 
imminent or actual harm, promote avoidance of painful stimuli and threats, and aid survival 
(Bateson, 1991; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). Social pain was thought to have co-opted the 
physical pain signaling system, on the basis of pain’s special capacity to snare attention, and the 
presence of selection pressures that would favor those adept at detecting risks to social inclusion (K. 
D. Williams, 2007a). The utility of a ‘piggy-backed’ signal (Nelson & Panksepp, 1998) therefore 
relies on individuals having sufficient ability to sensitively distinguish pain signals in order to 
respond appropriately and adaptively to the corresponding threat. Mere overlap in the qualities of 
painfulness oversimplifies this model and undercuts the utility of the threat calculus. To understand 
how people mount an appropriate response to threat, we need to take into account more than the 
qualities of the experience alone. The threat calculus requires concrete knowledge of where pain has 
come from, how it relates to prior experience, what its meaning is, and other factors that may come 
into play in driving an adaptive response to pain.  
Similarly, tethering social and physical pain based on how pain feels fits awkwardly with 
the concept of pain as a homeostatic emotion (A. D. Craig, 2003b). The premise of the homeostatic 
pain model is that pain is both a sensory and emotional experience that drives appropriate responses 
to maintain complex parameters required for the integrity of the body. Pain is viewed as more than 
just a somatosensory representation, or a sub-type of exteroception, because pain is different to 
other sensory modalities that provide information about the external world. Rather, pain carries a 
dual role, much like hunger or thirst. This makes pain both an interoceptive state (feeling in the 
body) and a functional driver of survival-regulation through motivation and action (A. D. Craig, 
2003b). It also indicates that pain that feels the same will trigger the same response, if the subjective 
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interoceptive experience of pain constitutes the motivational drive to respond. Accordingly, within 
this model, homogeneity of the pain experience undermines the usefulness of pain as a basic threat-
signal. This is because the utility of homeostatic pain is to prompt a cascade of tailored and specific 
responses that correspond to the nature of the imbalance to restore homeostasis. The output of this 
complex calculus is unlikely to be well-represented theoretically if pain itself is inadequately 
contextualised. The broken heart is not broken, even though it hurts – and the difference matters in 
driving action and response.  
Thus, we suggest that the prevailing focus on qualia overlap sits uncomfortably with 
evolutionary and homeostatic pain theories that are based on appropriate pain responding being a 
survival advantage. These theories invite a more nuanced picture of pain, beyond the experience 
itself, in order to realise their full explanatory potential. In line with this, a contextualised approach 
to pain opens the door to a more expansive inquiry into social and physical pain, through which 
these theoretical disparities might be examined and reconciled.  
Socio-behavioural responses and relational value. A further illustration of theoretical 
tension can be found in looking at socio-behavioural responses to pain, where we suggest the 
predictive value of a constrained notion of pain is trumped by a contextualised approach to pain. 
Marked differences in socio-behavioural responses to social pain show that even within social pain 
there is variability in how we react. This gives cause for caution in the context of pain overlap. 
Specifically, social pain is known to differentially trigger approach, avoidance and aggressive 
socio-behavioural responses. Forms of social pain such as social exclusion and rejection have been 
found to lead to emotional insensitivity and reduced empathy for others’ mishaps (DeWall & 
Baumeister, 2006); decreased donating, helping and cooperating (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, 
Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007); and increased aggression toward innocent others (Twenge, Baumeister, 
Tice, & Stucke, 2001). Conversely, interpersonal rejection has also been linked to a greater 
inclination to make new friends and work with others; to make more favorable impressions of 
potential new afilliative targets, and to offer higher rewards to new interaction targets (Maner, 
DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). Evidently there is substantial diversity in the socio-
behavioural consequences of social pain. This varied picture within social pain flags the need to 
carefully contextualise pain in order to explain why certain responses occur and when. Even within 
one pain ‘type’, responses to social pain cannot be determined based on the qualities of the 
experience alone – more information is required (Leary, 2005). 
Specifically, a key theme in social pain response theories is that responses are predicated on 
negative affect or reduced relational value flowing from social pain. Such theories rest on social 
pain being an innately negative experience. For instance, Smart Richman and Leary’s (2009) multi-
motive model of interpersonal rejection proposes that following post-event negative affect and 
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lowered self-esteem, different construals about the event (for example, about the prospects of 
relational repair, the social cost of the damage, and the duration of the loss) predict the nature of the 
motivated response. However, the model starts with the idea that social pain leads to an immediate 
lowering of self-esteem and increase in negative affect. How pain is construed is directly leveraged 
from these (negative) effects of social pain. In this way, Smart Richman and Leary’s (2009) theory 
highlights an important distinction in the psychology of social and physical pain. It sets the premise 
that experiencing social pain is negative in how it affects us as social beings, with the 
presupposition that the experience will give rise to negative affect and lower self-esteem.  
This directly brings attention to a major contrastive feature: social pain represents a tear in 
our social fabric, where social value, actual or perceived, has diminished, and the fundamental need 
to belong is undermined. In contrast, physical pain need not always give rise to immediate negative 
affect (Franklin, Lee, Hanna, & Prinstein, 2013) or lowered self-esteem, and instead may serve to 
display and promote personal virtues that offer social advantages (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al., 
2014). Physical pain can give the opportunity for martyrdom, to transcend bodily limitations, and 
display self-mastery, patience, endurance and efficacy (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al., 2014). 
Undergoing physical pain can reduce feelings of guilt and restore moral balance (Bastian, Jetten, & 
Fasoli, 2011; Bastian, Jetten, & Stewart, 2013), and lower one’s guilt and blameworthiness in the 
eyes of others (Gray & Wegner, 2010, 2011). While perceived or actual social devaluation or loss 
may accompany physical pain, there are many examples where it does not.    
These distinctions show the potential for a different approach in predicting and explaining 
responses to pain – one that accounts for where pain has come from and what it means to the person 
experiencing it, which cannot readily be imputed from the experience alone. For instance, physical 
pain might be engaged in agentically, bringing to bear a different frame for painfulness: physical 
pain is indeed generally aversive, but can also bring pleasure, for instance during pain (through 
sexual arousal, or sense of satisfaction from endurance), or after pain (through relief, contrast, 
positive appraisal, or sense of achievement; Franklin, Lee, Hanna, & Prinstein, 2013; Leknes, Lee, 
Berna, Andersson, & Tracey, 2011; see Leknes & Bastian, 2014, for review). There are interesting 
counter-examples in social pain terms, such as seeking out social pain through erotic humiliation, or 
self-isolation – yet whether these experiences can be considered analogous to agentic physical pain 
and in what respects remains an empirical question, as well as how social pain might itself be 
experienced differently when agentically sought out. Ultimately, this reiterates the need to 
contextualise pain in order to adequately develop theory around what the response to that pain 
might be. It also underscores the possibilities for novel hypotheses and the generation of empirical 
evidence to specifically test these areas of interest.  
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In sum, while social pain undermines relational value and self-esteem, there is a growing 
empirical basis to support the idea that physical pain may, perhaps counter-intuitively, elevate the 
self in ways that are relevant for socio-behavioural outcomes. More broadly, an emerging literature 
on the benefits of pain highlights new ways of thinking about pain outcomes (see Bastian, Jetten, 
Hornsey, et al., 2014 for review). This brings to light how social pain and physical pain can give 
rise to different socio-behavioural responses, and invites theoretical reflection and empirical 
consolidation with reference to pain overlap. Again, new lines of inquiry are opened by applying a 
contextualised approach to pain, and this promises a better understanding of both pains. 
Reflecting on Pain Overlap  
Acknowledging social pain as a construct that might share experiential qualities with 
physical pain expands our understanding of what pain is, and drives home some pressing 
definitional points. Over two decades ago, Morris (1991) shone a light on what he called the Myth 
of Two Pains, saying that ‘[w]e live in an era when many people believe – as a basic, unexamined 
foundation of thought – that pain comes divided into separate types: physical and mental. 
…Between these two different events we seem to imagine a gulf so wide that it might as well be 
filled by a sea that is impossible to navigate.’ (p. 9). Research into pain overlap demonstrates that 
we have left the shore. By understanding pain as subjective, we validate pain experiences that lack a 
clear physical aetiology. There is now greater acceptance of psychological explanations for physical 
pain phenomena, and of pain being more than nociception. However, a broader notion of pain 
brings new controversies about how to deal with what is now ‘mind pain’ (hurt feelings) and ‘body 
pain’ (feeling hurt). There is still scope to wonder whether  social pain can correctly be denied the 
status of pain if it is experienced as hurtful, as painful (Biro, 2010).  
Poetic hypotheses like pain overlap hold a special place within our scientific tradition. There 
is now a substantial line of research and commentary seeking to unpack how social pain might 
mirror physical pain (Cacioppo et al., 2013; DeWall et al., 2010; Eisenberger, 2012a, 2012c; 
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Iannetti et al., 2013; Lieberman & 
Eisenberger, 2009; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). With recent studies showing mixed support for 
neural overlap (Cacioppo et al., 2013; Rotge et al., 2015; Woo et al., 2014), it is timely to reflect on 
the posited domains of commonality between social and physical pain. These developments invite 
our consideration of the deeper implications of the search for similarity. Perhaps the subtext of the 
comparison seems to be that when associated with physical pain, social pain is bolstered in its 
existential veracity; the ‘realness’ of social pain is enhanced by association with physical pain, so 
that it might similarly deserve attention and remedy as physical pain does. Indeed, Eisenberger 
(2015) articulates these hopes: ‘Social pain is similarly conceptualised as being outside the purview 
of medical attention because it seems more psychological or emotional than physical. Focusing on 
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treating the affective component of pain might serve to level this playing field, putting the need to 
treat various types of physical and social pains at the same level of importance and perhaps 
providing new avenues for treatment.’ (p. 623). However, in developing a comprehensive 
psychology of pain, our own purview need not be confined to conventional medical 
conceptualisations or neural indices alone, in order to understand pain and bring attention to 
suffering. A scientific approach to pain reasonably leads to a desire to confine pain to what is 
observable, measurable, and even what is treatable. But both pains remain elusive as yet to perfect 
scientific extraction, despite technological advances. Pain remains complex and private, resisting 
objective scrutiny and measurement. Rather than suggesting scientific efforts are futile, these 
difficulties are a reminder that a comprehensive understanding of pain is where our best and most 
innovative efforts can be directed.    
The Next Wave: Future Directions in Pain Overlap 
 A critical test of the contextualised approach is whether its application can strike new paths 
for pain overlap research. We have proposed a framework for the contextualisation of pain that 
encourages consideration of the antecedents, cognitions and affect, and sociobehavioural 
consequences of pain. This is with the aim of setting out broad domains for analysis, beyond neural 
overlap, when examining how social and physical pain are interrelated. The next steps are to put 
this into action. Throughout this chapter we have highlighted illustrative examples and 
opportunities for the application of a contextualised model of pain, with the aim of expanding how 
pain overlap is approached. By utilizing what is already known about each pain in the psychological 
areas we have identified, researchers can critically examine whether social and physical pain give 
rise to the same patterns and effects. As more is learned about the science of each pain, we can 
continue to query whether each phenomenon also holds for its counterpart. We expect this cycle of 
reconceptualisation will be an enduring and generative process, and one that psychological 
perspectives must inform. Below we offer examples of how this process might progress. In setting 
these out, we do not propose to be exhaustive – again, the intention is to illustrate and guide rather 
than prescribe.  
The elaboration of antecedents and their effects. Where pain has come from is 
fundamental in developing a comprehensive understanding of painfulness, and we earlier set out a 
rationale for why it is important to account for antecedents of pain. There is a need for further 
research to take up this mantle. Our analysis has focused on antecedents in terms of the source of 
pain or its putative cause, as this has served to illustrate an essential component of how social and 
physical pain differ. Naturally, the antecedents of pain comprise more than just the classification of 
its source. In further elaborating the antecedents of pain, this opens the door to examining a range of 
temporal antecedents, the effects of which may reverberate for the duration of pain, and after pain. 
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In application to overlap, analyzing pain antecedents can more effectively unravel the factors that 
exacerbate or soothe and specifically reveal whether or not these factors operate consistently for 
both pain types. For instance, the knowledge that physical pain might bring a physical benefit helps 
the recipient to better tolerate it (Benedetti et al., 2013). Would the notion that social pain is ‘good 
for us’ serve a similar purpose? Intentional physical pain hurts us more than unintended pain (Gray 
& Wegner, 2008); yet what if harm was not the intended aim of the pain? Prior beliefs about causes 
of pain, conceptions about whether pain is biological or mysterious, motivated, personal, intended, 
deserved, beneficial, or worthwhile – these are all potential psychological contributors in the lead-
up to pain, for which overlap between social and physical pain should be critically tested. 
Furthermore, pain events do not occur in an experiential vacuum. Prior instances of pain 
give a salient and highly relevant context to new pain. For non-chronic physical pain, recent intense 
pain appears to create a new perceptual benchmark where subsequent moderate pain can be 
experienced as relatively pleasurable (Leknes et al., 2013; Leknes, Brooks, Wiech, & Tracey, 
2008). This relative ‘hedonic flip’ from painful to pleasant highlights how pain context shapes 
experience; but it remains to be tested whether social pain is also experienced in this way. After 
rejection or ostracism by desired social targets, the proposition that a subsequent yet smaller 
quantum of rejection might take on a pleasurable edge seems remote. Notably, emotional and 
physical numbing following social pain has been documented (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006; Maner 
et al., 2007; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003). However, it is plausible that in the context of 
very recent and intense social pain, a secondary social injury of the same nature would be rendered 
even more hurtful – a small twist of the knife made all the more painful by deep cuts of rejection 
preceding it.  
The lived experience of chronic pain also represents a complex antecedent for subsequent 
painfulness. Riva, Wesselmann, et al. (2014) have proposed an integrated chronic model of pain 
that suggests there is overlap in the development and maintenance of chronic social and physical 
pain – such as common antecedent factors (such as early and repeated pain experiences), 
maintenance factors (hypervigilance, fear) and outcomes (learned helplessness, worthlessness). 
Systematic and prospective substantiation of this model has yet to be carried out; while the 
theoretical fabric of the model emphasises commonalities, by laying out falsifiable hypotheses we 
see that it sets a path for identifying non-common factors also. We would advocate continued 
inquiry into the role of prior pain as a psychological antecedent of social and physical pain, both 
acute and chronic. 
These examples are non-exhaustive but illustrative of how contextualised pain can be used 
to develop novel hypotheses about antecedent factors and their effects, along which social and 
physical pain might (or might not) overlap. Being more expansive about pain antecedents also 
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means looking outside their specific analgesic or antagonistic effects. With the clear potential for 
pain antecedents to feed directly into the cognitive and emotional aspects of pain itself, we can also 
see potential for future research specifically into those cognitive and emotional domains. 
The further examination of pain cognitions and affect. As we have indicated, novel 
research opportunities lie in critically examining overlap in thoughts and emotions relating to pain. 
There are extensive opportunities to develop the literature further here; if we have been successful 
in expounding the need for a more contextualised approach to pain overlap, then what follows is 
likely to be a brief representation of the possibilities. We have noted the rich literature on cognitive 
and emotional features and modulators of physical pain (mood, attention, catastrophization), and 
highlighted the opportunity for cross-pollination by testing and comparing these phenomena in 
relation to social pain. We have also described empirical and theoretical research into fear of social 
and physical pain. Beyond these developments, there is scope to examine how personal, relational, 
social and cultural meanings of pain can transform painfulness; and in turn how this might be the 
same or different for social and physical pain. Articulating and empirically examining the 
implications of these meanings in a systematic way is an important yet presently neglected area of 
pain overlap research. Pain as punishment, pain as damage, as necessary or character-building, as 
triumph, pleasure, or growth: fertile ground for future research lies in the meanings of pain and the 
psychological implications and functions of those meanings. For instance, if physical pain can 
reduce feelings of guilt and restore moral balance (Bastian et al., 2011), could social pain deliver 
the same psychological dividend? More concretely, we would expect a link between how pain is 
cognitively appraised and represented, what pain means, and how it is responded to. Next we 
discuss future research directions for pain overlap in terms of behavioural consequences.    
Investigation of pain responses. We have outlined the potential for sociobehavioural 
responses to pain to be diverse. Responses to pain can minimise damage, impact ability to obtain 
support, and underpin the evolutionary basis of pain’s effectiveness as a signal. These primeval 
imperatives are part of what binds pain into the human condition, but are only part of the picture. 
Much theorizing on pain relies on the basic imperative to avoid pain: avoiding damage, the risk of 
death, and aversiveness. Yet in many psychosocial contexts, “facing up to pain” carries positive 
connotations: a sportsperson battling though injuries to complete the game; a mother eschewing 
analgesics during the birth of her child; a martyr enduring suffering as spiritual devotion. In each of 
these scenarios, the imputation of agency and the choice to avoid or endure tells much about the 
psychosocial value of the act, and indicates the potential for collective understandings over and 
above acknowledgement of or empathy for the pain itself. Determining whether we reach out to 
others, or deny opportunities for connection, requires a contextualised approach to pain, in order to 
explain why certain responses occur and when.  
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For instance, it is unclear whether subjecting the self to social pain would connote positive 
attributes in the same way as the “facing pain” examples given above. If preexisting beliefs about 
the legitimacy of suffering differ between social and physical pain, then it is feasible that how we 
react to these pains in relation to others could differ. Others’ responses to pain provide the social 
context in which pain is experienced, and perceptions about whether others will understand what 
one is going through could readily be expected to impact on whether support is sought or not. 
Reaching out to others may heighten perceptions of vulnerability, yet there are well-documented 
benefits where social support is accessed, or even merely salient, during and after pain (J. L. Brown 
et al., 2003; Jones & Jetten, 2011; Master et al., 2009). Along similar lines, exploring differences in 
how social and physical pain are displayed or communicated also provides scope to examine the 
value of pain displays in informing how others perceive and respond to people in pain. This could 
better connect literatures on sociobehavioural responses to pain (for example, Bastian, Jetten, & 
Ferris, 2014; Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 
2011; Maner et al., 2007; J. Park & Baumeister, 2015; Sommer & Bernieri, 2015) with literatures 
on others’ empathy for pain (for example, Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Decety, Echols, & Correll, 
2010; Nordgren, Banas, & MacDonald, 2011; Ruben & Hall, 2013) – looking critically at 
similarities and differences for social and physical pain. Again, while we have simply extracted 
some specific examples and themes here, each serves to indicate the potential for new research 
trajectories to develop, and the value of the contextualised approach in moving closer to an 
understanding of how physical and social pain interrelate. 
Conclusions: Reconnecting to a Psychology of Pain  
Present contributions to understanding pain overlap have largely concentrated on pain’s 
experiential qualities and neurological manifestations. But important theoretical and functional 
differences exist between social pain – as a pain that necessarily generates fundamental 
recalculations of our social world and ourselves in it – and physical pain, as a pain that comprises 
sensory and emotional aversiveness that may or may not be socially nested. These fundamental 
differences have faded from prominence in theorizing about physical and social pain overlap. While 
most research attention has focused on commonalities, we advocate a contextualised notion of pain 
that can support greater attention to unique and even non-overlapping aspects of social and physical 
pain.  
With this review, we have highlighted some consequences of focusing on pain qualia 
overlap. Beyond the literature on social and physical pain overlap, much progress has been made in 
transitioning away from strictly medicalised perspectives and toward a broader biopsychosocial 
model. Paradoxically, it seems an overemphasis on pain qualia and the pain experience may have 
stemmed from modern conceptualisations acknowledging pain as subjective, and as more than 
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nociceptive, stimulus-driven or impersonal. We suggest psychological approaches to pain overlap 
can be adjusted to align with the broader movement toward a biopsychosocial model of pain.  
This simply means a shift in how pain is approached – a shift to contextualise pain in terms 
of its antecedents, and the cognitions and emotions surrounding pain, with a view to better 
conceptualising how people make meaning from and respond to pain. Accounting for where pain 
has come from reveals that physical pain and social pain are fundamentally different beyond the 
subjective state. Considering how people appraise, make meaning, or anticipate pain moves pain 
away from a passive percept, and generates a richer set of bases on which to compare and contrast 
social and physical pain. In explaining how people respond to pain, we expect contextualised pain 
to offer more predictive value: from adaptive reactions to a survival threat, to an agentically sought 
experience of pain-as-pleasure. A broader analysis provides the way forward in reconnecting to a 
psychology of pain.  
We have not set out precisely where overlap lies or its boundary conditions. Instead, we 
have proposed a contextualised approach to pain to reinvigorate examination of similarities and 
differences across novel domains. To set matters in perspective, while debate continues on the 
substance of neurological overlap, evidence of functional pain-type crossover remains (e.g., 
Eisenberger et al., 2006; Way et al., 2009). Other features traced out by MacDonald and Leary 
(2005), such as a common language for social pain in physical terms across cultures, and evidence 
of physical pain analgesia following social pain (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006) hold empirical value. 
These foundations do support continued examination of pain overlap, but we have proposed some 
critical modifications and an expanded purview in terms of how this exercise should go forward.  
Iannetti et al. (2013) describe the pain overlap story as a ‘glamorous marriage of metaphor and 
modern science’. Indeed, there is considerable intellectual glamour where literary anecdote and 
hard science meet. However, beneath the surface, the benefits of the overlap metaphor must be 
balanced against the potential for information loss. We risk reducing the concept of pain itself to its 
core experiential component if overlap in the pain experience is overemphasised – we risk losing a 
psychology of pain. Decontextualising pain obstructs the greater intellectual contribution that can 
be made by situating pain of both types within the psychological world. Already, pain is ‘all in the 
mind’: we simply need to contextualise it.    
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Chapter 3 
 
Pain is a fundamental human experience that triggers a range of social and psychological responses. 
This chapter presents behavioural and fMRI data to examine the effect of multiple group 
memberships salience on reported and neural indices of pain. Findings were that participants 
expressed higher levels of pain when more social group memberships were salient. This is 
consistent with the notion that pain itself motivates people to communicate their pain, and more so 
when multiple psychological resources are salient. In addition, fMRI results revealed an interesting 
twist: when participants increased their pain reporting as group memberships increased (from one 
group to four), there was a corresponding relative reduction in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and 
anterior insula activation. These results provide evidence for an adaptive response to pain: the more 
people make use of the social resources at their disposal when experiencing pain, the less pain areas 
are activated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 is the published article: 
Ferris, L. J., et al. (2016). Increased Pain Communication following Multiple Group Memberships 
Salience Leads to a Relative Reduction in Pain-Related Brain Activity. PLoS One 11(9): 
e0163117.  
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Increased pain communication following multiple group memberships salience leads to a 
relative reduction in pain-related brain activity 
Pain is a subjective sensory and emotional experience that contributes substantially to global 
disease burden (Fernandez & Turk, 1992; International Association for the Study of Pain, 
1994/2016; Price, 2000). Pain is private, subjective, and intrapersonal; but it is also experienced and 
expressed within a social context (K. D. Craig, 2009; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011; Mogil, 2015; 
Morris, 1991; Scarry, 1985). Communicating pain to others is a key step in securing aid and social 
support from others (A. C. Williams, 2002). This makes it important to understand how social 
resources contribute to how pain is experienced and reported.  
Social group memberships are one way to examine how social resources affect pain and its 
communication. Group memberships – and the social identity that we derive from them – can be 
considered valuable resources that people may draw upon in responding to pain. By self-
categorizing as a member of a group, individuals derive social identity that dynamically informs 
their understanding of self relative to others (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The term ‘group’ is defined 
broadly, such that a person may self-categorise as a member of a social or demographic category 
(males, Americans), or other groups based on different parameters (scientists, cancer survivors; 
Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012). With relevance to pain, there is a growing body of work showing 
the role of group memberships in buffering and overcoming suffering (Cruwys, South, Greenaway, 
& Haslam, 2014; Dingle, Cruwys, & Frings, 2015; Drury, 2012; Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, Dingle, & 
Jones, 2014). It follows that membership in more groups should arm people to better respond to 
painful challenges, and if group memberships are resources, then more resources should flow from 
the salience of more group memberships. This notion builds on the idea of ‘the social cure’, 
whereby group memberships can deliver socioemotional and health benefits by building social 
resources (Jetten et al., 2014). 
However, it remains to be seen precisely how these resources affect pain communication. 
Combining neuroimaging with pain reports provides a way to understand pain on behavioural and 
neural levels (Wager & Atlas, 2013; Wager et al., 2013), and here we examine how these indices 
are affected by salient social group memberships. Does the salience of one’s group memberships 
buffer the pain experience and diminish the need to report pain (lower pain reporting), or 
alternatively, does it imply a supportive environment or ‘safe space’ to express and communicate 
our pain (elevated pain reporting)? We explore these opposing predictions in turn. 
Groups Facilitate Communication of Pain  
Group memberships are a scaffold for communication because they provide common 
language, goals, motivations, and ‘shared reality’ (Greenaway, Wright, Willingham, Reynolds, & 
Haslam, 2015). Although pain is a subjective, internal experience, pain can be conveyed to others 
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through facial expression, non-verbal vocalization, pain behaviours, and language. The social 
milieu in which these processes occur plays a critical role in determining their nature and outcomes 
(Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011). Expressing pain to our ingroup is functional: at a basic level, pain 
communication can aid the sufferer by limiting exposure to the nociceptive source and minimizing 
damage, as pain expressions and distress vocalizations provide valuable signals to conspecifics on 
potential risks, dangers, and ameliorative action required (K. D. Craig, 2004; Herman & Panksepp, 
1978; A. C. Williams, 2002; Yamada & Decety, 2009). Expressing pain can itself serve 
psychological functions – simply vocalizing pain improves pain tolerance, such as saying “ow” 
(Swee & Schirmer, 2015) or even swearing (Stephens, Atkins, & Kingston, 2009; Stephens & 
Umland, 2011). Signalling pain is also a way to engender empathy and helping behaviours in 
others, because seeing others in pain elicits empathy and helping, particularly between ingroup 
members (Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009).  
If expressing pain to those around us serves to enhance the provision of support, this 
strategy is more likely to serve as a functional response to pain when more social resources are 
available or perceived. On this basis, communicating pain in response to social groups is adaptive 
because it facilitates access to psychosocial resources, and may even carry its own inherent payoffs. 
In short, people may be more likely to express their pain the more social resources are salient.   
Buffering Pain: What Do Groups Offer?  
An alternative line of reasoning shifts the focus to group memberships as a more direct 
buffer for pain. There is now a wealth of evidence demonstrating the positive impact of belonging 
to social groups on health and well-being, and the deleterious effects of social isolation (Cacioppo, 
Capitanio, & Cacioppo, 2014; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 2010). Social support is linked with 
reduced pain and lower analgesic consumption during childbirth (Cogan & Spinnato, 1988; Hodnett 
et al., 2015), better recovery from surgery (King, Reis, Porter, & Norsen, 1993; Kulik & Mahler, 
1989); and improved pain adjustment in the context of chronic pain (Lopez-Martinez, Esteve-
Zarazaga, & Ramirez-Maestre, 2008). Reassurance from ingroup (versus outgroup) members during 
pain reduces physiological arousal measured by galvanic skin response (Platow et al., 2007).  
It follows that if group memberships are an important resource during pain, the more of this 
resource one has, the better protected one is. Jones and Jetten (2011) provided experimental 
evidence for the ‘more the merrier’ effect by varying the number of group memberships (1, 3 or 5) 
that were made salient to participants. Participants were asked to self-categorise in terms of either 
one, three or five social groups, and then to write about why each of the relevant groups was 
important to them. In conditions where more group memberships were salient, participants were 
able to endure physical pain from the cold pressor task for longer periods. Notably, when five 
groups were made salient participants were able to keep their hand in freezing water twice as long 
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as participants for whom only one group membership was made salient. Aside from the tangible 
support that group membership provides, this suggests that the mere psychological availability and 
salience of social group membership acts as a resource for building resilience. However, questions 
remain. As Jetten and Jones’ (2011) dependent measure involved resilience in the face of challenge, 
it is less clear how participants’ experience of pain itself was affected. Did participants experience 
less pain when more group memberships were made salient, or simply tolerate it for longer?  
J. L. Brown et al. (2003) compared ratings of pain during the cold pressor task when a friend 
or stranger was present, versus pain alone. They also manipulated the type of contact: active 
support, passive support, or general interaction (i.e. involving unstructured talk with the other 
person present). While this study focused on a single interaction partner and not the salience of 
group membership, the results show that social support can reduce pain reports: compared to pain 
experienced alone, active and passive support conditions produced significantly lower pain reports 
than pain experienced alone. However, these effects were observed regardless of whether a friend 
or stranger was present. Furthermore, participants in the general interaction condition reported more 
pain than the active or passive support conditions, with mean pain levels no different to the alone 
condition. It is difficult to reconcile these findings with other experimental evidence of increased 
pain tolerance and reduced arousal when social resources are salient. Ultimately, the findings 
indicate that how pain is affected by others is not straightforward, and there is a need to consider 
further whether pain reports in the context of social groups are a function of painfulness, or an 
adaptive signal of responsive support-seeking.  
Measuring Pain Communication and Pain-Related Brain Activation 
Pain is complex and multidimensional, and pain (a subjective unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience) should be distinguished from nociception (the activation of pain receptors in 
the body; International Association for the Study of Pain, 1994/2016). It is important to point out 
that pain self-reports are generally considered the gold standard in measuring and understanding a 
person’s pain (IASP, 1994/2016); however, this is not without debate. Wager and Atlas (2013) 
propose that pain self-report is insufficient to characterise the pain experience and the processes 
underlying pain (see also, J. E. Brown et al., 2011; Wager et al., 2013).  
The characterisation of a diagnostic neurologic signature for pain has also been debated 
(Apkarian, 2013; Legrain et al., 2011; Mouraux, Diukova, Lee, Wise, & Iannetti, 2011; see also,  
Poldrack, 2006). A wide variety of brain areas are activated when experiencing pain, including the 
somatosensory cortex, cerebellum, thalamus, insula, cingulate cortex, as well as frontal and parietal 
areas (Legrain et al., 2011). In this study we were particularly interested in the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior insula (AI) given that these regions across the neuroimaging 
literature are most consistently implicated when experiencing physical pain (Lamm, Decety, & 
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Singer, 2011; Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000; Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & 
Bushnell, 1997). Insular regions are proposed to subserve representations of physiological states of 
the body as a foundation of interoception, including specific regions instantiating pain (A. D. Craig, 
2002, 2009, 2011; Woo et al., 2014). The dACC is posited to integrate pain, negative affect and 
cognitive control (Shackman et al., 2011), and dACC activation also maps onto pain sensitivity 
(Coghill et al., 2003). This makes these regions appropriate candidates to examine the impact of 
salient group memberships on pain reports and brain activation patterns associated with pain. In an 
attempt to triangulate measurement, in our research we combine neuroimaging (i.e., the 
measurement of brain activity as an index of pain) with self-reports of pain. 
Overview of the Research 
 In this study, we examined two ways in which group memberships can act as a 
psychological resource that affect responses to pain. First, focusing on the notion of pain as a signal 
of the need for support, we predicted that the more group memberships are made salient, the greater 
reporting of pain we would find, because more salient group memberships should elicit increased 
pain communication (H1; communication hypothesis). Alternatively, and rather straightforwardly, 
salient groups may buffer people from experiencing pain. This would lead to the prediction that the 
more group memberships are made salient, the less pain people will report (H2; buffering 
hypothesis). We also examined brain activation in dACC and AI in order to explore whether social 
group salience would impact pain reports and neural indices in the same way. We specifically 
looked at the change in these measures between the multiple-group and single-group conditions. 
Method 
Participants  
 Twenty participants (4 males) participated in the fMRI experiment (Mage= 22.45, SD = 1.99 
years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and cleared tests for MRI safety. 
We aimed to collect data from a sample of 20 and data collection ceased once this sample size was 
reached. All participants signed written informed consent and were reimbursed $30 for their 
participation. The study was approved by the University of Queensland Behavioural and Social 
Sciences Ethical Review Committee.  
Design, Materials and Procedure  
 The study involved a repeated-measures design. Pain and group salience were manipulated 
to create four conditions: three painful conditions (multiple-group; single-group and multiple-
traits2) and one non-painful condition (control). Participants presented individually for testing over 
                                                        
2 For completeness and transparency we describe and report the multiple-traits condition in our 
Method and Results sections. However, the condition is peripheral to our central hypotheses and is 
therefore not addressed in detail in the Results and Discussion.  
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two sessions scheduled no more than a week apart. In the first session, participants were briefed 
with study information, tested for fMRI safety, and signed written informed consent. Next they 
were asked to describe four social groups they identified with and that were important to them (for 
example, groups such as university friends, church group, work friends, or yoga club) along with 
four traits that described them well. These responses were then used to develop stimuli for use in 
the second session.  
In the second session, participants were briefed and invited to enter the fMRI scanner. The 
fMRI procedure consisted of five repeated functional runs (~8 minutes each), and a structural scan 
(~5 minutes) between the third and fourth run. At the beginning of each run, participants were 
presented with the instructions as a reminder. The instructions read: “You will see either: a) 1 group 
word, b) 4 group words or c) 4 traits presented on the screen during which painful or non-painful 
stimulation is applied at different intensity levels. During the stimulation try to think about the a) 1 
group; b) 4 groups or c) 4 traits.” After the instructions at the beginning of each run, a white 
fixation dot was presented on a black screen for 7.5 seconds, followed by the event sequence. Each 
functional run consisted of 48 events consisting of the four different conditions (12 events per 
condition) which lasted 10 seconds per event (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of an event during the fMRI experiment. At the start of the 
event, participants were presented with their four groups, one of their groups or their four traits for 
five seconds and during this time had to think about the words presented on the screen. After two 
seconds, participants received either painful (toothpick) or non-painful (Q-tip) stimulation. After six 
seconds, participants had three seconds to rate how painful the stimulation was. At the end of the 
event, a fixation dot appeared on the screen for 1 second.  
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 Group salience manipulation. In the multiple-group condition, at the start of each event, 
the four group-words from the first session were presented underneath each other for a total 
duration of 5 seconds (Figure 1). During these 5 seconds, participants were instructed to think about 
their four groups, which ensured that the relevant social resources would be salient during the pain 
manipulation. In the single-group condition a single group-word was presented for 5 seconds 
together with three lines of Xs which had the same number of characters as the missing words in the 
multiple-group condition. The Xs were used to match the visual stimulation in the single-group 
condition with that of the multiple-group condition to minimise differences attributable to variation 
in visual input. During this condition, participants were instructed to think about the one group. The 
particular group displayed was pseudo-randomly chosen for each event so that each of the four 
group-words was presented three times during each run. During the multiple-traits condition, the 
four trait words were presented on the screen for 5 seconds, and participants were instructed to 
think about these traits. In the non-painful condition, either four group words, one group word or 
four traits were presented (3 times each per run).  
 Pain manipulation. During the fMRI experiment, an experimenter was located next to the 
scanner wearing headphones. To implement the pain manipulation, the experimenter was instructed 
by two different 1-second beep tones to stimulate the participant’s finger for a duration of 1 second. 
In the three pain conditions, the experimenter applied painful pressure using a toothpick; while in 
the non-painful condition pressure was applied using a Q-tip. This procedure is similar to one used 
previously in the literature (Morrison, Lloyd, Di Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004). Crucially, the 
experimenter was blind to the presentation of group salience stimuli and unaware which groups 
condition (multiple-groups, single-group or multiple-traits) the participant was experiencing. Each 
beep tone was delivered to the experimenter 2 seconds after the start of the event; the stimulation 
lasted for 1 second so the participant was still thinking about the multiple groups, one group or 
multiple traits when experiencing the stimulation. After the group manipulation a 1-second fixation 
point appeared on the screen. Next, participants were given a 3-second response window to rate 
how painful the stimulation was by pressing one of four possible response buttons. These buttons 
corresponded with a 4-point rating scale based on the Wong Baker Pain Scale (Wong & Baker, 
1988; see Figure 1), from 1 – ‘no hurt’ to 4 – ‘hurts even more’. Both pain rating responses and 
reaction times were recorded. At the end of the event, a fixation dot appeared for 1 second and then 
the next trial began. At the end of each run an 8-second fixation point was presented.  
 fMRI image acquisition. A 3-Tesla Siemens MRI scanner with 32-channel head volume 
coil was used to obtain the data. Functional images were acquired with the gradient echo planar 
imaging (EPI) with the following parameters: repetition time (TR) of 2.5 seconds, echo time (TE) 
of 36ms, flip angle (FA) of 90˚. Thirty-six transversal slices with 64x64 voxels at 3mm2 in-plane 
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resolution and a 10% gap in between the slices covered the whole brain. Whole brain images were 
generated every 2.5 seconds, and 202 images were acquired during each functional run. The first 
five images – during which no stimuli were presented – from each functional run were removed to 
allow for steady-state tissue magnetization. A three dimensional high resolution T1-weighted whole 
brain structural image was acquired after the third run for anatomical reference (TR = 1900, TE = 
2.32ms, FA = 9˚, 192 cube matrix, voxel size = 0.9 cubic mm, slice thickness = 0.9 mm). 
 fMRI analyses. We used SPM8 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) operated 
through Matlab (http://www.mathworks.com.au/products/matlab/) to analyze the data. To counter 
head movements all EPI images were realigned to the first scan of each run. The anatomical image 
was then coregistered to this mean functional image. To correct for variation in brain size and 
anatomy between participants, each structural scan was normalised to the MNI T1 standard 
template (Montreal Neuropsychological Institute) with a voxel size of 1x1x1mm using the 
segmentation procedure. The same segmentation parameters were then also used to normalise all 
the EPI images to the T1 template with a voxel size of 3x3x3mm. This process mathematically 
transformed each participant’s brain image to match the template so that any chosen brain region 
would refer to the same region across all participants. Before further analysis, all images were 
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 6mm.  
 As part of the first level of analysis, two general linear models were created for each 
participant. For each participant in each of the four conditions (i.e., no pain, multiple-group, single-
group and multiple-traits), regions with significant Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) 
changes in each voxel were identified using an event-related design time-locked to the time of the 
stimulation (i.e., model 1; 2 seconds after the start of the event) or at the start of the rating (i.e., 
model 2; 6 seconds after the start of the event). 
In the second level of analysis contrast images for each condition across all participants 
were included in a factorial design. First a network was identified that was differentially activated 
for the painful minus non-painful conditions in model 1. We were particularly interested in the 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and left and right insula (left AI and right AI) given the fact 
that these regions are most consistently associated with experiencing pain. Therefore, a region of 
interest (ROI) analysis was performed within the cingulate cortex and insula (anatomically defined 
by the WFU PickAtlas program: http://www.fmri.wfubmc.edu/cms/software). This analysis was 
thresholded at p < 0.001, and a voxel-level threshold with a familywise error rate (FWE) of p < .05 
corrected for the size of the region of interest (ROI) was used to define significant activation. 
Subsequently, percentage signal change was extracted from the significant regions in this contrast 
for the three painful conditions for model 1 and 2 using the MarsBaR toolbox 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). We were particularly interested to see if people would 
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communicate their pain more when thinking about multiple versus single group memberships and if 
this would lead to a relative reduction in dACC and AI activity. If increased pain reporting in the 
multiple-groups condition is more effective than in the single-group condition, the strongest relative 
reduction in activation would be present in model 2 (i.e., at the time of pain reporting). 
Results 
Behavioural Results 
 Pain rating. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
pain rating between the four conditions, F(3, 57) = 672.22, p < 0.001, ηG² = 0.94 (Figure 2; Lakens, 
2013). As expected, during the no-pain condition, participants reported less pain (M = 1.04, SE = 
0.03) than in the multiple-group (M = 2.62, SE = 0.04, p <.001), single-group (M = 2.54, SE = 0.03; 
p < 0.001) and multiple-traits (M = 2.55, SE = 0.05; p <.001) conditions. Crucially, participants 
reported feeling more pain in the multiple-group (M = 2.62, SE = 0.04) than in the single-group 
condition (M = 2.54, SE = 0.03; p = 0.024, 95% CIdiff = [.008, .144]), although the amount of 
painful stimulation was the same in both conditions. No other differences were significant (see 
Appendix A for data availability statement). 
Figure 2. Mean pain ratings for the group salience conditions (no-pain control on the right y-axis). 
Higher scores indicate more pain reporting. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Pairwise 
comparisons are Bonferroni corrected. *** p < .001; * p = .024. 
 
Reaction time. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
rating speed between the four conditions, F(3, 57) = 8.05, p < 0.001. During the no-pain (M = 841, 
SE = 53) condition, participants responded faster than in the multiple-group (M = 947, SE = 47; p = 
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0.04) and multiple-traits (M = 959, SE = 49; p = 0.04) condition but not faster than in the single-
group (M = 923, SE = 50; p =.14) condition. No other differences were significant.  
fMRI Results 
 Painful minus non-painful stimulation. Significantly more activation was found in dACC 
(6, 20, 46; k = 93; Z = 4.81; p = .001), left (-33, 20, 7; k = 53; Z = 4.01; p = .028) and right AI (33, 
17, 7; k = 25; Z = 3.88; p = .042; Figure 3A). The % signal was then extracted from these regions 
combined for the three pain conditions, for model 1 and model 2. A repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no difference in activation between the multiple-group (M = 0.21, SE = 0.05), single-group 
(M = 0.19, SE = 0.06) and multiple-traits (M = 0.24, SE = 0.05) condition for model 1, F(2, 38) = 
0.98, p = 0.381. A similar repeated measures ANOVA revealed no difference in activation between 
the multiple-group (M = -0.06, SE = 0.04), single-group (M = -0.06, SE = 0.05) and multiple-traits 
(M = -0.01, SE = 0.04) condition for model 2, F(2, 38) = 1.53, p = 0.230. This indicates the pain 
activation was similar across the three conditions at the time of stimulation and rating, as might be 
expected given that the amount of painful stimulation was similar across the three conditions.  
 
Figure 3. fMRI results. A. Significant brain activation for painful minus non-painful stimulation in 
left and right insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex displayed on a ch2better template using 
MRIcron software. B. Mean % signal change for activations shown in A for the three painful 
stimulation conditions at time of stimulation (i.e., model 1) and at the time of the rating (i.e., model 
2). Note: The baseline for model 1 and 2 is different (because they represent two different models) 
and therefore results between model 1 and 2 should not be directly compared against each other. 
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More relevant is the question of whether increased pain reporting in the multiple- versus 
single-group condition leads to a relative reduction in dACC and AI activation. To investigate this, 
the difference in pain rating for the multiple-group minus the single-group condition was correlated 
with the difference in % signal change for the multiple-group minus the single-group condition 
(both for model 1 and model 2). A one-way Pearson correlation revealed a marginal negative 
correlation for model 1, (r(19) = -.35, p = .068) and a significant negative correlation for model 2 
(r(19) = -.49, p = .014, r2 = .24; Figure 4). This shows that the more participants shared their pain in 
the multiple-group versus the single-group condition, the less activation was detected in dACC and 
AI in the multiple-group versus the single-group condition.  
Figure 4. Scatterplot of differences in reported pain and % signal change (model 2) from single- to 
multiple-group condition. A relative increase in pain reporting as salient group memberships 
increased was associated with a corresponding relative reduction in dACC and AI activation.  
 
Discussion 
 Pain is complex, private, and subjective, and the impact of social resources on how pain is 
experienced and communicated is not yet fully understood. In this study, we manipulated how 
many group memberships were salient to examine the effect of multiple group memberships on 
reported and neural indices of pain. We examined evidence for two competing hypotheses: first, 
that experiencing pain in the context of salient group memberships would lead to greater reporting 
of pain (H1; communication hypothesis). Second, that the salience of social groups that one belongs 
to would buffer people from experiencing pain, so that the more group memberships are made 
salient, the less pain people would report (H2; buffering hypothesis). We also examined brain 
activation in regions implicated in the experience of pain to explore whether the salience of a 
varying number of group memberships would impact pain reports and neural indices in the same 
way. 
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Behavioural findings were supportive of the communication hypothesis. Rather than a direct 
reduction in pain reports as a function of group membership salience, behavioural data showed that 
participants reported increasing levels of pain the more their group memberships were made salient. 
Specifically, participants reported more pain in the multiple-groups condition compared to the 
single-group condition. However the number of group memberships alone did not affect dACC and 
AI activation, which is consistent with the fact that the painful stimulus was the same across pain 
conditions. Instead, we found that ramping up pain reports as group memberships increased was 
associated with a corresponding relative reduction in dACC and AI activation. In essence, 
communicating pain by increasing pain reports in response to changes in social group resources was 
associated with a greater reduction in these neural indices of pain. 
 This finding is interesting and shows for the first time that being aware of social resources 
associated with group memberships enhances the extent to which pain is reported. It also 
demonstrates that making use of these social resources by increasing pain communication links with 
a corresponding relative reduction in brain activation in regions associated with pain. This adds to 
the literature on the role of group memberships as a psychological resource, particularly multiple 
group memberships (Jetten et al., 2015; Jetten et al., 2014). Social group memberships offer 
belonging, meaning, purpose, and even ‘existential security’ (Durkheim, 1912/1995; Greenaway, 
Cruwys, et al., 2015; S. A. Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, & Doosje, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). This helps to explain why group memberships can provide particularly important social 
resources in times of adversity.  
 The present study’s findings are also consistent with other work highlighting the 
psychosocial utility of communicating pain. There are a range of barriers to effectively 
communicating pain to others (Wager & Atlas, 2013), and pain is routinely underestimated by 
medical practitioners, parents, carers, and others (K. D. Craig, 2009; Kappesser, de C. Williams, & 
Prkachin, 2006; Poole & Craig, 1992). However, communication of pain, particularly in the context 
of ingroups, enhances the likelihood that empathy is aroused and social support is provided (K. D. 
Craig, 1968; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011; A. C. Williams, 2002). The present study points to 
social group memberships as eliciting pain communication, and that even when invoked distally, 
the mere psychological availability and salience of social groups membership acts as a resource.  
Making use of changes in these resources (i.e. by communicating pain accordingly) appears 
to impact the pain experience itself, based on brain activation data. The current findings therefore 
suggest that communicating pain in response to changes in the number of salient group 
memberships is a particularly functional and adaptive response to the subjective pain experience. 
Communicating pain is a way to secure the psychosocial resources that ingroup members can 
provide (see for example, Platow et al., 2007). However, the present study also provides insight into 
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the potential emergence or maintenance of maladaptive pain responses, such as pain catastrophizing 
(Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan, Martel, Tripp, Savard, & Crombez, 2006; Sullivan et al., 2001). While 
there may be immediate benefits for communicating pain when there are more salient social 
resources, over time these social resources may become tapped, or unilateral signals may be 
misunderstood. This can lead to a mismatch between pain communication and responder support 
which can result in suboptimal care experiences and poorer outcomes (Cano, Leong, Heller, & 
Lutz, 2009; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011; Prkachin & Craig, 1995; Sullivan, 2012). 
Critically, this study is the first to report a divergence in pain reports and pain-related brain 
responses and to this extent provides insight into the possibility that these indices of pain are not 
always in lockstep. Physiological and self-report pain measures might not always overlap and this 
has implications for how we measure and conceptualise pain (Corns, 2013). The present findings 
show the informative value of measuring pain using different techniques, as both contribute to the 
scientific understanding of pain.  
The present study also has limitations, such as the constraints on ecological validity inherent 
to research conducted within fMRI settings. In an effort to address this, we aimed to make the group 
membership stimuli as relevant and applicable to our participants as possible, by asking participants 
to nominate the particular groups that were important to them. We also took methodological steps 
to exclude distraction or inattention as possible explanations for the differences between conditions 
by ensuring stimuli were visually equivalent. One could argue that even if the visual stimuli are the 
same, participants might experience more distraction in the multiple-group condition vs. the single-
group condition given that the task requires thinking about four groups instead of just one. 
However, if general distraction were at play, one would expect people to report less pain in the 
multiple-groups condition (because they are more distracted). Instead we find the opposite: people 
report more pain in the multiple-group condition vs. the single-group condition. We also found no 
differences in reaction times between the pain conditions. Therefore, it is unlikely that basic 
distraction could explain the pattern of findings in the present study.  
In conclusion, by manipulating the number of salient group memberships that people belong 
to, we found that participants increased their pain reports when multiple group memberships were 
salient. However, when participants increased their pain reporting in response to the number of 
group memberships, there was a corresponding relative reduction in activation in brain regions 
associated with pain (dACC and AI). These findings point to an adaptive response to pain and 
suggest that group memberships act as psychological resources that can be brought into play during 
painful experiences. The more people make use of the social resources they have at their disposal 
when experiencing pain, the less pain areas are activated. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Pain serves as a bodily signal of danger or damage, and is typically considered an experience to be 
avoided or numbed. An emerging literature speaks to the benefits of collective aversive experiences 
like shared pain; yet there is little research on the psychosocial implications of enjoying the 
aversiveness that results. In this Chapter, I present a field study that examines pain, pleasure, self-
revelation and social identification in a collective painful event – a mass winter solstice swim in 
Hobart, Tasmania. Individuals taking part in the swim were surveyed (N = 194) before and after 
submerging their bodies in very cold water (approximately 11°C). Swimmers showed significantly 
higher levels of social identification following the swim than before, and were more likely to 
describe their participation as revealing something about ‘who I am’. This self-revelation effect was 
most strongly evident for those reporting high levels of pleasure and pain, which in turn predicted 
positive change in social identification over the course of the event. These data demonstrate a role 
for pleasure and suggest a candidate mechanism for increased identification from intense affective 
experiences – in other words, pleasurable pain fostered more identification because participants felt 
more firmly that the event revealed something about who they are.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 is the manuscript in preparation: 
Ferris, L. J., et al. (manuscript in preparation). Pleasurable pain promotes increased identification 
by revealing the self.  
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Pleasurable Pain Promotes Identification by Revealing the Self 
Pain hurts. Pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience – an evolved 
homeostatic emotion that motivates action to protect the organism against damage (A. D. Craig, 
2003b; International Association for the Study of Pain, 1994/2016). Pain seeking behaviour implies 
a failure to adequately respond to pain as a signal of threat to bodily integrity, which on appearance 
carries risks to survival. On this basis one would not expect humans to seek out or enjoy pain. 
Philosophers from the utilitarian tradition have long placed pleasure and pain as fundamental 
drivers of human action, and these experiences have been portrayed as opposites (Bentham, 
1789/1907). 
However there is reason to expect more to pain and pleasure than this. There are a range of 
instances where individuals and groups do actually seek out pain – as a rite of passage, in proof of 
group loyalty, or to show personal attributes like strength or piety (Atran & Henrich, 2010; 
Glucklich, 2003; Henrich, 2009). The popularity of mass events like the Dutch New Year swims 
(Niewjaarduik), triathlons and marathons, Coney Island Polar Bear gatherings and cold swims, 
show that people seek out painful activities (Bleakley et al., 2012; Bridel, 2010; Buijze, Sierevelt, 
van der Heijden, Dijkgraaf, & Frings-Dresen, 2016). These ‘violations of hedonism’ hint at the 
possibility that pain can be positive, perhaps even enjoyed (Fredrickson, 2000, p. 578).  
 A developing literature has begun to elaborate on the psychosocial benefits of experiences 
involving pain, particularly in collective group contexts (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al., 2014). 
After undergoing pain with others, human beings are more cooperative, prosocial and generous, and 
feel more connected and identified with others around them (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; 
Xygalatas et al., 2013). However, despite these effects, there is little research on the implications of 
enjoyment or pleasure in these collective painful experiences. While sharing painful experiences 
with others has previously been shown to promote bonding, here we examine the role of enjoyment 
in this relationship. Furthermore we aim to understand a possible psychological mechanism through 
which this occurs by focusing on self-revelation – i.e. revealing the self.  
Shared Pain (And Pleasure) Binds Us 
Research on the impact of collective painful experiences has largely drawn on real-life 
instances of ritualized pain as part of religious and cultural traditions (Konvalinka et al., 2011; 
Xygalatas et al., 2011; Xygalatas et al., 2013). For instance, Xygalatas et al. (2013) compared 
charitable giving and social group identification patterns during Hindu festival of Thaipusam in 
Mauritius after two different forms of mass religious ritual. Participants taking part in the Kavadi, a 
high-ordeal ritual in which devotees pierce their skin with large skewers and hooks, subsequently 
went on to donate nearly twice as much money as when taking part in religious prayer and 
meditation sessions. The painful nature of the high-ordeal experience was key in driving these 
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prosocial donation outcomes. Specifically, Xygalatas et al. (2013) found that the amount of pain 
people experienced and reported predicted the dollar value of subsequent charitable giving – the 
more pain, the more people donated.  
Laboratory studies involving naïve groups have also borne out prosocial effects from pain. 
In three experimental studies with participants randomly allocated to condition, Bastian, Jetten, and 
Ferris (2014) found greater group cohesion and cooperation in groups who completed painful tasks 
together (cold-pressor task, hot chilli eating, or wall squats), compared to groups who completed 
comparable non-painful tasks together. Participants in the pain condition rated their groups as more 
cohesive, and were significantly more likely to select choices conferring a group benefit in an 
economic games paradigm. Unlike previous field studies, participants in these experiments were 
allocated to novel groups without pre-existing religious or social structures to bind them. This 
suggests that shared pain can facilitate group formation even in the absence of prior social 
scaffolding, such as religious or social groupings.   
To understand the psychological benefits of collective pain, we must also consider how 
people can derive enjoyment from painful experiences. Enjoyment may arise because pain activates 
a cascade of endogenous opioids that persists after pain itself has ceased (Leknes & Tracey, 2008; 
Zubieta et al., 2001). Pain provides a contrastive experience for pleasure (Kahneman, Fredrickson, 
Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993) even leading to ‘hedonic flips’ where subsequent lesser pains 
become pleasant (Leknes, Lee, Berna, Andersson, & Tracey, 2011). These pleasurable effects of 
pain have been linked to enhanced taste sensation (Bastian, Jetten, & Hornsey, 2014) and the 
tendency to indulge in pleasurable rewards (Bastian et al., 2013). There are also many examples of 
everyday ‘benign masochism’ in which negatively-valenced experiences are enjoyable, from 
relishing scary movies, appreciating ‘aggressive victuals’ like hot chillies or substances with bitter 
tastes (Klein, 2014, p. 42), or the elation of a terrifying rollercoaster (Fredrickson, 2000; Rozin et 
al., 2013; Rozin & Schiller, 1980).  
At a group level, sharing intense joy, pleasure and enjoyment in the collective is the essence 
of what brings human beings together into bonded groups and communities (Ehrenreich, 2006; 
Fredrickson, 1998, 2004; Haidt, Patrick Seder, & Kesebir, 2008). In anthropological terms, intense 
collective experiences provide an ecstatic primal foundry for the genesis of deep communal bonds, 
with Durkheim’s collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1912/1995) and Turner’s notion of 
communitas (Haidt et al., 2008; E. Turner, 2012; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). In line with the 
evidence that people do indeed seek out and enjoy painful experiences, we next consider how 
enjoyment might contribute to social bonding between individuals in painful contexts.  
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Why do intense experiences lead to social bonding and identification?  
 Although well documented, the psychological mechanism through which intensely painful 
or pleasurable experiences might facilitate social bonding remains unexamined. While some have 
argued for the effects of memory (Richert et al., 2005) or attentional focus (Bastian, Jetten, & 
Ferris, 2014) there is as yet no empirical consensus on how such experiences might increase 
feelings of bondedness and identification with others. One line of work has argued that participation 
in extreme rituals, such as those involving collective pain, provides a signal to others about our 
values or attributes (Atran & Henrich, 2010; Watson-Jones & Legare, 2016) – in essence, revealing 
social information to others around us about who we are. Considering cognitive processes at the 
individual level, Fredrickson (2000) proposed that moments of peak affect evoke the most meaning-
making and reveal information to oneself about ‘how much you can handle’ (p. 592) – providing 
evidence of a person’s own vulnerabilities and abilities to contend with the vicissitudes of 
experiential life. Perhaps together then, these intensely painful yet pleasurable collective 
experiences subjectively reveal the self, and help us to understand who we are.   
The Current Study 
The present work examines pain, pleasure, self-revelation, and identification in the context 
of a collective naked cold swim during the southern hemisphere winter solstice. Exposure to and 
immersion in very cold water places considerable demands on physiology of the body (Pendergast 
& Lundgren, 2009), and is generally considered painful. We examined whether the collective cold 
swim was experienced as painful and pleasurable, and what identity functions this would serve in 
terms of self-revelation and social identification.   
Shared pain promotes social bonding, and intense affective experiences reveal social and 
identity-relevant information to ourselves and others around us. We therefore expected swimmers 
would feel a stronger sense of social identification with others following the swim, and feel more 
firmly that the event revealed something about who they are. We then examined the role of pain and 
pleasure in predicting such changes. With the premise that pain and pleasure may not be mutually 
exclusive, we tested whether pain, pleasure, and their interaction would predict changes in self-
revelation and social identification arising from the swim. Finally, we were interested in exploring 
the processes behind such changes— i.e. whether self-revelation engenders increased social 
identification.   
Method 
Participants  
The final sample comprised 194 members of the general public taking part in the Winter 
Solstice Swim at the Dark Mofo Winter Festival in Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. Participants 
ranged in age from 19 to 76 years (Mage = 43.08 years, SD = 13.60; 118 female, 73 male, 3 did not 
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specify). All swimmers were invited to participate online via email from the event organizers, with 
follow-up recruitment by study representatives onsite before and after the event. All participants 
provided informed consent. We aimed to collect approximately 200 participants with matched pre-
post data. A total of 2773 provided data in the pre-event survey, while two participants provided 
post-event responses without completing the pre-event survey. Swim participants with complete but 
unmatched data from either time point were excluded, N = 83), leaving a final sample of 194 
participants with matched pre- and post-event data (attrition rate of 30%). No significant differences 
were found in time 1 variables for the attrition group versus the adequately sampled group (ps > 
.09).  
The final sample represents approximately 26% of all swimmers reported by organizers on 
the day (N = 752). All participants were offered entry into a prize draw for a $250 voucher as an 
incentive for their participation. Ethical clearance was given by the University of Queensland’s 
School of Psychology Ethics Review Committee and methods were carried out in accordance with 
the relevant guidelines and regulations. 
Design, Measures, and Materials 
 We employed a repeated-measures design with surveys administered before and after the 
event. At both time-points, the survey measured self-revelation (how much participation in the 
event reveals something about who I am); social identification (identification with other swimmers 
and the festival, connection and trust); and demographics. The post-event survey asked about the 
degree of pain and pleasure during the event, the duration of immersion, and current pain at the time 
of completing the survey. 
 Pre-event survey. Participants had the option to undertake an online or hardcopy survey. In 
both formats, participants were asked to provide a valid email address in order to receive the post-
event survey, and to confirm the event they were about to attend. Next a series of brief 
questionnaire items measured identification, social connection, and trust, each along a seven-point 
scale from (1 – Not at all to 7 – Very much so)4. Two items measured identification with other 
                                                        
3 This excludes participants who did not specify or attend a relevant event (N = 24); or provided 
only an email address in the pre-event survey and no substantive response on any of the key 
measures of interest (N = 20). No significant differences were found in time 1 variables for those 
who provided substantive responses in the attrition group versus the adequately sampled group.    
4 Pre- and post-event questionnaires also measured additional variables not reported here for brevity 
(see Supplementary Materials; Appendix B). These measures include two pictorial items relating to 
identity fusion with other swimmers and the festival (Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici, 
2009; Swann, Jetten, Gomez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012); two items on self-esteem and 
meaningful existence (I feel good about myself; My existence is meaningful) linked to fundamental 
psychological needs (K. D. Williams, 2007b); one item on the extent to which participation in the 
event allowed participants to get back to basics; and two items relating to similarity and connection 
with animals (Amiot & Bastian, 2015, 2017). 
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swimmers and identification with the festival overall (adapted from Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 
2013; for example, I identify with the other people at this event, I identify with Dark Mofo); two 
items measured connection with and trust in others taking part in the event (I feel a strong 
connection to other people at this event; I can trust the other people at this event). These items were 
combined to create a single variable of social identification (α = .82). One item measured revealing 
the self (Taking part in this event shows something about who I am). Finally, participants provided 
age and gender details, and generated a unique code for pre- and post-event survey matching. 
Post-event survey. The online survey link was emailed to all participants who provided a 
valid email address in the pre-event survey. Participants also had the option to undertake the survey 
in hardcopy onsite with study representatives. The post-event survey included the same items 
concerning self-revelation, social identification (α = .86), demographics, and asked participants to 
generate a unique code, with the addition of three items concerning pleasure and pain from the 
event (How pleasurable was the event?, How painful was the event?) and painfulness at the present 
time (I am feeling pain right now) on the same 7-point scale. Participants were also asked to 
indicate how long they had remained in the water, were probed for insight (Do you know what this 
study is about?), and were given the opportunity to provide any additional comments in an open 
text box response format. 
Procedure  
Solstice swim. All swim participants were required to register with event organizers before 
taking part in the swim. Registered swimmers were invited to participate in the study by event 
organizers via an email approximately one and a half days before the swim. The email provided 
links to study information and the pre-event survey link. The pre-event survey was closed once the 
swim began. 
The swim was held at sunrise on the banks of the Derwent River at Long Beach, Sandy Bay, 
Hobart on the morning of the winter solstice (22 June 2015). The ambient air temperature was 0.8°C 
and water temperature approximately 11°C. Swimmers were provided with caps and towels by 
event organizers, changed out of their clothing, and waited on the shore in towels until invited to 
disrobe and enter the water by officials at the rising of the sun. Gongs were sounded and colored 
smoke flares fired as swimmers entered the water en masse. Swimmers were free to remain in the 
water as long as they wished; there was the option to swim out to buoys located approximately 50m 
offshore, or simply to enter the water with others as desired. Organizers reported a total of 752 
swimmers on the day. The post-event survey link was emailed immediately after the swim was 
completed. Participants were encouraged to fill in the survey as soon as possible after finishing the 
event. Participants completed the survey, and were debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
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Analytical strategy. Participants’ pre- and post-event responses were matched using their 
unique code and crosschecked with other data fields where possible to prepare for analysis. Once 
responses were matched we examined descriptive statistics and post-event survey lag. To test our 
hypotheses regarding pain, pleasure, self-revelation and identification, we conducted paired t-tests 
to discern pre- to post-event changes in the key outcome measures of self-revelation and 
identification attributable to the event itself. We then tested pain and pleasure as specific predictors 
of these changes with regression analyses.   
Results 
Pain and Pleasure 
Mean pleasure experienced during the event was above the mid-point at 6.13 (SD = 1.28), 
while mean pain experienced during the event was reported at 4.15 (SD = 1.95; see Table 1). Mean 
current pain reported at the time of actual survey completion was 1.88 (SD = 1.58). Figure 1 shows 
the two-dimensional co-distribution of pleasure and pain ratings of the swim. Pain ratings were 
platykurtic while pleasure ratings were negatively skewed and showed evidence of ceiling effects, 
indicating that the majority of participants indeed found the swim pleasurable.  
Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for swim experience characteristics and response lag. 
  
M (SD) 
Correlation 
1 2 3 4 
1. Pain 4.15 (1.95)     
2. Pleasure 6.13 (1.28) -.21**    
3. Duration of exposure  157 (135) -.17*  .15*   
4. Post-event response lag 251   (233) -.10 -.20** -.13  
5. Pain now 1.88  (1.58) .52*** -.10  .00 -.32*** 
Note: Correlations are Spearman’s rho for variables treated non-parametrically. *** p < .001;   
** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed). 
 
Duration of exposure.  Data on swim duration was obtained for 97% of the cleaned and 
matched dataset (n = 188). Reported immersion time ranged from 15 seconds to 15 minutes (M = 
157 seconds, SD = 135). Duration of exposure was negatively related to pain (ρ = -.17, p = .020) 
and positively correlated with pleasure (ρ = .15, p = .041), suggesting that immersion time i.e. 
stimulus exposure is not an analogue for painfulness or pleasure in this setting.   
Timing of post-event responses. The post-event lag for responses to the second survey 
ranged from approximately 16 minutes to 16 hours 50 mins post-swim (M = 251 mins, SD = 233). 
Approximately 75% of the cleaned and matched sample (n = 146) completed the survey within six 
hours of the swim, with approximately 50% responding within three hours. A longer delay post-  
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Figure 1. Co-distribution of pain and pleasure reports arising from the swim. Centre panel shows 
two-dimensional histogram of pain and pleasure ratings from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so), with 
count data embedded in heatmap. Horizontal axes show pain distribution with count data; vertical 
axes show pleasure distribution with count data.   
 
event was associated with ratings of lower pleasure during the event (ρ = -.20, p = .004) and lower 
pain at the time of survey completion (ρ = -.32, p < .001), but was not related to ratings of 
painfulness during the event (ρ = -.10, p = .179).      
Pre- to Post-Event Changes  
Paired t-tests (see Table 2) revealed a significant increase from pre- to post-event for 
outcome measures relating to self and others. Significant positive change from pre- to post-event 
was seen in self-revelation (Mpre = 5.37, SD =1.69, Mpost = 5.73, SD = 1.359, d = .25). Social 
identification increased pre- to post-event (Mpre = 4.60, SD = 1.36, Mpost = 5.38, SD = 1.24, d = .65); 
and this was also the case for each underlying item, with a significant increase in trust in others 
(Mpre = 4.94, SD = 1.57, Mpost = 5.55, SD = 1.46, d = .45), connection with others (Mpre = 4.15, SD = 
1.84, Mpost = 5.30, SD = 1.52, d = .67), identification with other swimmers (Mpre = 4.49, SD = 1.74, 
Mpost = 5.45, SD = 1.50, d = .53), and identification with the festival (Mpre = 2.93, SD = 1.13, Mpost = 
3.18, SD = 1.05, d = .27).  
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Table 2.  
Pre- and post-event descriptive statistics, paired t-test outcomes, and effect size for self-revelation 
and social identification variables. 
 M (SD)     
 Pre-event Post-event t p 95% CI of the 
difference 
 
d 
Self-revelation 
 
5.37 (1.69) 5.73 (1.35) 3.45 .001 [.157, .575] .25 
Social identification 
 
4.60 (1.36) 5.38 (1.24) 9.00 <.001 [.608, .949] .65 
Trust 
 
4.94 (1.57) 5.55 (1.46) 6.18 <.001 [.414, .802] .45 
Connection 
 
4.15 (1.84) 5.30 (1.52) 9.23 <.001 [.900, 1.389] .67 
Identification with 
swimmers 
 
4.49 (1.74) 5.45 (1.50) 7.41 <.001 [.703, 1.214] .53 
Identification with 
festival 
2.93 (1.13) 3.18 (1.05) 4.27 <.001 [.216, .588] .27 
         
 
Next, we tested whether subjective pain and pleasure during the event predicted change in 
the outcome variables of self-revelation and identification. We first tested the relationships between 
positive change in self-revelation, and pain and pleasure experienced during the event with 
regression analyses. We found a marginal main effect of pain on change in self-revelation (b = -.68, 
t = -1.96, p = .051, 95% CI [-1.359, .0035]), no main effect of pleasure (b = -.29, t = -1.02, p = .309, 
95% CI [-.839, .267]), and a significant pain-pleasure interaction (b =.12, t = 2.21, p = .028, 95% CI 
[.013, .225]). Simple slopes analysis showed a conditional positive effect of pleasure at high 
(+1SD) pain (b = .44, t = 3.88, p < .001, 95% CI [.216, .663]) but not low (-1SD) pain (b = -.02, t = 
-.14, p = .888, 95% CI [-.367, .318]); such that positive change in the self-revelation motive was 
maximized when both pain and pleasure were high (see Figure 2). Johnson-Neyman regions of 
significance analysis showed the conditional effect of pleasure on self-revelation motive was 
significant when pain ratings reached a value of 4.12 and above (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2. Plot of simple slopes showing mean change in self-revelation motive at low (-1SD) and 
high (+1SD) pleasure and pain.  
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Figure 3. Johnson-Neyman analysis of regions of significance showing that the effect of pleasure 
on change in self-revelation is non-zero at pain ratings of 4.12 or greater. 
 
We also tested whether pain, pleasure and their interaction term predicted changes in social 
identification over the course of the event. For social identification, traditional regression analyses 
did not reveal a significant effect of pleasure, pain, or pleasure-pain interaction on positive change 
in social identification (ps > .13). Johnson-Neyman regions of significance analysis showed a 
significant conditional effect of pleasure on change in social identification when pain ratings were 
equal to a value of 4.77 and greater, reflecting the contribution of pain and pleasure in explaining 
variance in social identification at levels higher than mean pain, noting that these variables were not 
normally distributed.   
We then examined the processes underlying changes in social identification arising from the 
swim. Given the theoretical rationale that ‘revealing the self’ connects us with others, we undertook 
process analyses to examine whether the pleasure-pain effect on self-revelation might explain the 
changes in social identification over time (see Figure 4). We used the PROCESS macro (Model 7) 
with 5000 bootstrapped samples to test a moderated mediation in which pleasure served as the 
predictor, pain as the moderator, positive change in self-revelation as the mediator, and change in 
social identification as the outcome variable (Hayes, 2015). This analysis revealed a significant 
conditional indirect effect, in which the interaction of pleasure and pain predicted increased social  
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Figure 4. Process model showing a conditional indirect effect of pain and pleasure on positive 
change in identification via change in self-revelation. At high pain (+1SD): IE = .1558, SE = .0598, 
95% CI [.0717, .3131]; at low pain (-1SD), IE = -.0087, SE = .0794, 95% CI [-.1998, .1198]. Index 
of moderated mediation = .0422, SE = .029, 95% CI [.0030, .1177], R2 = .07. 
 
identification through positive change in self-revelation (index of moderated mediation = .0422, SE 
= .029, 95% CI [.0030, .1177], R2 = .07). In other words, pleasure served as a significant non-zero 
predictor of this process only when pain was high (+1SD; IE = .1558, SE = .0598, 95% CI [.0717, 
.3131]). When pain was low (-1SD), the indirect effect of pleasure could no longer be considered 
non-zero (IE = -.0087, SE = .0794, 95% CI [-.1998, .1198]).    
Because our study design does not permit definitive inferences of causality in the order of 
these processes, we also tested an alternative model post hoc, in which social identification was 
substituted as the mediator, and self-revelation served as the outcome variable. Neither pain, 
pleasure, nor their interaction predicted the a path to the mediator (social identification) in this 
alternative model, suggesting that changes in social identification do not explain the pain-pleasure 
effect on self-revelation.    
Discussion 
As we come to better understand the benefits of collective pain, it is important to understand 
the implications of enjoyment also. This study aimed to unveil the role of pleasure in the context of 
a painful collective activity, and to examine links between pleasure, pain, self-revelation and social 
identification with participants undertaking a mass naked cold swim. Consistent with previous 
research on shared pain (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; Xygalatas et al., 2013), our results showed 
a significant increase in social identification over the course of the swim. Participants felt more 
bonded and identified more strongly with others after sharing a painful collective activity together. 
Underlying this finding, we found increased trust and connection with other swimmers, and 
identification with other swimmers as well as the overall festival including non-swimmers.  
We also found that participants experienced a greater sense of self-revelation following the 
swim. This self-revelation effect was significant at the cohort level from pre- to post-swim, and was 
b
direct
 = .05 p = .492, (b
total
 = .14, p = .061) 
b = .47***, p < .001 
pain x pleasure 
b = .12*, p = .028 
pleasure 
∆ social identification 
∆ self-revelation pain 
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most strongly evident for those reporting high levels of pleasure and pain from the swim. 
Experiencing high pain and pleasure in this collective activity predicted positive change in self-
revelation. In turn, increased self-revelation then explained positive change in overall social 
identification. These data suggest a candidate mechanism for increased social bonding from intense 
affective experiences – in other words, that pleasurable pain fostered more social identification 
because participants felt more firmly that they had revealed something about who they are.  
The present study offers a real-life exemplar of benign masochism and provides an insight 
into what participants stand to gain from pain and its enjoyment. For those of us watching from the 
shore, collective painful events like cold swims can appear striking because of the extreme nature of 
the activities involved; pleasure or enjoyment can seem like a distant and unlikely prospect. In 
explaining our results, one possibility is that pleasure simply makes pain more bearable. Studies on 
cognitive modulation of pain have examined the value of distraction and positive affect in reducing 
painfulness (Villemure & Bushnell, 2002). Pleasant diversions amuse and attract attention, 
redirecting cognitive resources away from pain and towards alternative positively-valenced stimuli 
(Villemure & Bushnell, 2009). However, these and similar studies involve experimentally-induced 
and additional pleasant stimulus, such as scent or positively-valenced images, rather than obtaining 
pleasure in a painful experience in and of itself. Our data suggest that people can report the same 
activity as both highly painful, and highly pleasurable, when given the opportunity to do so – and 
that when this is the case, people feel more firmly that the self is revealed. 
Our results also suggest that rather than escaping or losing the self (Baumeister, 1988; 
Ehrenreich, 2006), taking part in the swim reveals the self. The novelty of our results lies in the 
notion that experiencing pain and pleasure together can generate this greater sense of self-
revelation. Intense affective experiences provide peak moments of great salience and meaning-
making value, in which we reveal socially relevant information to others, and which convey 
information about vulnerability or capacity within ourselves (Fredrickson, 2000). We also found 
evidence of the self-revelation effect as a candidate mechanism for increased social identification 
from shared intense experiences. The present findings suggest that experiencing intense pleasure 
and pain serves identity functions and establishes much more than propinquity – revealing the self 
and binding the individual to others.   
More broadly, the present findings also speak to the importance of social context in 
understanding the function of shared mixed-valence experiences like pain and pleasure. Much of 
the psychological research has examined painful collective practices in the context of established 
religious, sporting, or social groups in which one is already a member (Bridel, 2010; Cohen, 
Ejsmond-Frey, Knight, & Dunbar, 2010; Drury, 2012; Konvalinka et al., 2011; Vezzali, Drury, 
Versari, & Cadamuro, 2015; Xygalatas et al., 2011; Xygalatas et al., 2013), or as a means of 
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initiation into valued groups (Mann et al., 2015). Although there are now a number of studies into 
shared pain and its benefits, these explorations have not asked participants about pleasure.   
This study demonstrates the effects of pain and pleasure on self-revelation with a medium-
sized sample in a field context outside the laboratory. We have proceeded with the assumption that 
pleasure and pain are not mutually exclusive, and may be experienced together and measured 
discretely (Larsen, McGraw, Mellers, & Cacioppo, 2004). Importantly too, our findings relate to 
agentic pain – pain that is freely and consensually chosen. Some research has focused on collective 
survival and growth through adversities such as natural disasters and emergencies (Drury, 2012; 
Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009; Vezzali et al., 2015). These are often tragic circumstances where 
pain and suffering is visited upon individuals and groups – certainly not welcomed, much less 
enjoyed. It would be incongruous to presume that enjoyment plays a role in such circumstances. 
The inherent restrictions of field surveying have meant our study design is absent a control 
group which would better allow causal inferences, and does not allow us to establish precisely how 
pain and pleasure might operate to create these effects in real time. While we identified significant 
changes over time, we did not find a main effect of pain in our process models, in the absence of a 
no-pain comparison (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; Xygalatas et al., 2013); and ultimately, we 
identified an interaction which would qualify any main effects. Recalling mixed emotions 
represents a cognitive summary of past experience, and is vulnerable to decay over time (Aaker, 
Drolet, & Griffin, 2008). We relied upon self-report ratings of pain and pleasure after the event, 
which makes it difficult to unpack expectancies and subjective experience from post-hoc 
reappraisal, or to understand how pain and pleasure vary over time during the event. Live 
experiential tracking and real-time physiological correlates could add valuably to the empirical 
foundations the current research sets down.     
Conclusions 
In sum, pain and pleasure have both received extensive philosophical and empirical 
consideration as fundamental human experiences. However, the present research is among a small 
handful of studies examining the combination of pain and pleasure in the field. This research 
challenges the assumption that pleasure and pain are mutually exclusive, unlocking fascinating new 
territory in how people benefit from painful and pleasurable experiences in the collective. Henrich 
(2009) observed that activities involving high levels of pain carry significant physical and 
emotional costs, which seem to render them unsustainable from an evolutionary perspective; but 
psychological and social dividends may indeed be found on further inspection. We have shown one 
instance where such benefits are apparent. For those participants who take part, it seems that going 
through pain and pleasure together is a chance to meet those most fundamental of human needs – to 
reveal who we are, and to help us feel connected with those around us.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Pain enjoyment has historically been relegated as perverse, pathological or as a sexual predilection 
shared by few. However, research also shows that pain enjoyment occurs in normative, non-
pathological and non-sexual domains such as sport, and cultural and religious rituals. A growing 
collection of research, including this thesis, has advanced the notion that pain may be beneficial, 
and for this reason people may seek out and even enjoy pain. What remains to be examined is how 
pain enjoyment is perceived by others, whether it comes with immoral connotations (as case 
examples might suggest), and what underpins any moral judgements of those who do enjoy pain. 
This chapter therefore undertakes an empirical examination of the moral status of pain enjoyment, 
and tests two related mediating pathways of unconventionality and disgust to explain why pain 
enjoyment may attract moral downgrading. In 2 studies, online respondents rated vignettes 
describing individuals undertaking enjoyable activities that were either painful or not (Study 1); or 
painful activities that were enjoyable or not (Study 2). Results showed that pain enjoyment 
consistently attracts judgements of lower moral status and that unconventionality and disgust 
statistically mediated the moral downgrading of pain enjoyment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 is the manuscript in preparation: 
Ferris, L. J., et al. (manuscript in preparation). Pleasurable pain is morally diagnostic and attracts 
moral penalties.  
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Pleasurable Pain is Morally Diagnostic and Attracts Moral Penalties 
Pain and pleasure are basic percepts that are fundamental to human experience – distinct, 
recognisable, and reasonably familiar to us. When combined however, pain and pleasure elicit a 
vexed philosophical and moral quandary (Baumeister, 1988, 1989/2014). Even though pain 
enjoyment can be observed in normative and non-sexual settings (Ferris, Jetten, & Bastian, 
manuscript in preparation; Klein, 2014; Rozin et al., 2013), historically, pain enjoyment has 
attracted moral condemnation and has been described as deviant, perverse, or pathological 
(Brenner, 1959; Freud, 1929). In the present work we examine the perceived morality of pain 
enjoyment. We empirically test the notion that people enjoying pain may be morally downgraded 
by observers, and investigate perceived strangeness and disgust as two potential mediators of this 
effect.  
Pleasure and Pain 
Pain is ubiquitous and important for survival – it captures attention and motivates action, 
typically avoidance (A. D. Craig, 2003b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Fernandez & Turk, 1992). 
Pain provides information about threats to the body and flags a potential breach of bodily integrity. 
Despite this, at times pain is associated with positive attributions and outcomes. For instance, pain 
attracts diverse meanings (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000) that may not only be associated with damage 
and destruction (Scarry, 1985), but are also linked to positive growth, stoicism, or cleansing 
(Bastian et al., 2011; Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al., 2014).  
While pain may deliver positive outcomes, enjoying pain itself is counterintuitive. It is 
therefore worthwhile to address the question of how pain can ever co-occur with pleasure. Research 
has indicated that people do show a propensity to enjoy a range of negatively-valenced experiences, 
including pain. In describing the phenomenon of ‘benign masochism’, Rozin et al. (2013) identified 
a range of normative exemplars of aversive and negatively-valenced experiences from which 
pleasure can arise, such as enjoying sad or scary movies, or imbibing bitter, sour or astringent food 
and drink. Similarly, there is evidence of pain enjoyment in the context of sport and other physical 
challenges (Bridel, 2010; Gard & Meyenn, 2000); childbirth (Norr, Block, Charles, Meyering, & 
Meyers, 1977); and ‘aggressive victuals’ such as chilli-eating (Klein, 2014; Rozin, Gruss, & Berk, 
1979; Rozin & Schiller, 1980). Pleasurable pain also attends some extreme devotional or religious 
activities, such as ecstatic devotion or possession (Glucklich, 2003), in which painful activities such 
as flagellation are undertaken to ostensibly induce a state of elevation in which participants feel 
spiritual connection to their deity. 
In their review of the positive consequences of pain, Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al. (2014) 
suggested that pain itself facilitates pleasure, for example through making bodily experiences 
salient (Bastian, Jetten, & Hornsey, 2014; Scott, Cayla, & Cova, 2017); as a contrastive experience 
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(Kahneman et al., 1993; Leknes et al., 2013), or even through moral licensing of indulgences after 
unfair pains (Bastian et al., 2013). Recent empirical findings indicate that experiencing pain and 
pleasure in collective settings can promote connection and serve identity functions by revealing 
who we are (Ferris et al., manuscript in preparation). Together, these provide a range of reasons 
why pain may attract positive associations, even pleasure.  
Having briefly reviewed evidence of the various links between pleasure and pain, the next 
step is now to consider how onlookers regard this phenomenon – what is its moral status from the 
perspective of observers? We therefore next consider the moral relevance of pain enjoyment from 
the perspective of the observer.  
Attracting Moral Judgments From Observers   
Pain enjoyment is a salient affective display from which observers may infer moral 
qualities. Social observers are highly motivated to obtain information about the moral qualities of 
others (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Affective states and displays provide social 
information of moral relevance that the observer can utilise to make inferences about the moral 
character of the target, and their propensity to undertake relevant behaviours that signal character 
(Szczurek, Monin, & Gross, 2012; Uhlmann et al., 2015; Watson-Jones & Legare, 2016). 
Judgments of others’ moral qualities reference the thoughts and deeds a person is inclined to 
undertake (give to charity, cheat others), and a person’s character, such as whether they are honest 
or fair (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013). As one 
form of affective display, pain displays have substantial communicative value and are highly salient 
to others (Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2011; A. C. Williams, 2002). In short, observers are motivated 
to make sense of affective states like pain enjoyment, and moral judgements concerning character 
and proclivities are one way this motivation may be actioned.   
What specifically about experiencing pain and pleasure in combination would inspire moral 
judgements about a person? Socio-moral norms provide one explanatory account (Haidt, Rozin, 
Mccauley, & Imada, 1997; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). According to this account, 
breaches of socio-moral norms violate shared understandings about right and wrong (Rozin et al., 
1999). With reference to pain and enjoyment, it is normative for pain to involve unpleasantness and 
even suffering, rather than enjoyment. Pain is aversive and typically unpleasant (Auvray et al., 
2010; A. D. Craig, 2003a; Fernandez & Turk, 1992; Price, 2000). On this basis, enjoying pain may 
be anti-normative and run against people’s basic intuitions about what is right and wrong in 
reference to pain itself. In other words, a person experiencing enjoyment with pain represents a 
violation of socio-moral norms about pain, and therefore would attract moral downgrading from 
observers.  
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If so, there remains a need to explain what might specifically drive such moral judgments. 
Two potential candidates emerge from the morality literature. First, the idea that pain enjoyment is 
unconventional or strange is one hypothesis. Although not all strange things are perceived to be 
immoral, many behaviours judged to be immoral are also ostensibly strange (Gray & Keeney, 
2015). Quite straightforwardly, the hedonic mismatch of painfulness and enjoyment may breach 
socio-moral norms, and attract moral downgrading because it is perceived to be unconventional. 
Second, disgust is a valid candidate for why pain enjoyment could attract moral downgrading. 
Disgust is a moral emotion that is elicited by violations of socio-moral norms (Haidt et al., 1997; 
Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006), as well as bodily incursions (Bentham, c1785/1978; 
H. A. Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Rottman, Kelemen, & Young, 2014), and 
which is potentially relevant to the case of pain enjoyment on both grounds. Core disgust is 
considered to be based on adaptive responses to survival threats such as pathogens and disease 
vectors, while socio-moral disgust is considered to be a cultural product that functions to preserve 
shared social and cultural norms (Haidt et al., 1997). If pain enjoyment signifies a breach of socio-
moral norms about pain itself, it may give rise to socio-moral disgust. In short, pain enjoyment may 
attract moral downgrading because it elicits disgust.   
In sum, pain and pleasure arguably create a morally relevant affect state that would attract 
the moral judgement of others. Literature on socio-moral norms suggests that pain enjoyment is 
likely to be morally downgraded by others, and unconventionality and disgust provide two possible 
explanations.  
The Current Studies 
The present work investigates the moral status of pain enjoyment from the perspective of 
observers. With 2 studies, we aimed to empirically test whether pleasurable pain attracts a moral 
penalty from others. Participants were shown a vignette describing a person in a pain-enjoyment 
scenario, or a no-pain control (Study 1) or no-pleasure control (Study 2). Participants gave 
judgements about that person’s moral character and proclivity to have moral thoughts and deeds, 
and rated whether they considered the behaviour of the target disgusting and unconventional. We 
predicted moral downgrading for pain enjoyment relative to controls, and tested unconventionality 
and disgust as mediators of this effect. In other words, pain enjoyment would be positively 
associated with observers’ ratings of unconventionality and disgust, and that this would predict 
moral downgrading by observers. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we presented participants with vignettes describing a person doing an activity 
bringing them enjoyment. We manipulated pain, with the target either in pain or not. In order to test 
whether pain enjoyment was morally downgraded relative to no-pain enjoyment, we then measured 
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moral judgments of that target person. We also tested perceived strangeness and disgust as potential 
mediators of the anticipated moral downgrading of pain enjoyment.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
The sample consisted of 239 participants5 (167 male; Mage = 31.52 years, SD = 9.18; 29.4% 
non-White) recruited through MTurk, with 92.5% reporting English as their first language. We used 
an experimental design with random allocation into two conditions (pain, no-pain). We manipulated 
pain by varying the level of pain described in the vignette, i.e. pain (N = 121) and no-pain (N = 
118). Each participant was exposed to a single vignette item out of the eight possible vignettes per 
condition.   
Procedure  
Participants were recruited through MTurk, supplied with study information and asked for 
informed consent. Next each participant viewed a single vignette describing a person engaging in an 
activity they enjoy (described further in Materials and Measures below). In the pain condition, the 
activities were painful and the enjoyment specifically linked to painfulness. In the control condition, 
a comparable no-pain version of each activity was used. Then participants completed the moral 
judgements questionnaire by rating the morality of the person described in the vignette. 
Specifically, participants were asked to rate the person’s proclivity to undertake moral or immoral 
actions; and their possession of moral traits (described in detail below). Finally, participants 
reported their demographic information (age, gender, preferred language, country of birth and 
ethnicity), and were then debriefed, thanked and paid for their time. 
Materials and Measures 
 Enjoyment vignettes.  Sixteen vignettes described a person taking part in an activity they 
enjoy. A total of eight target persons were described, each in a pain and no-pain version (‘Briana’, 
‘Michael’, ‘John’, ‘Amanda’, ‘Daniel’, ‘Brad’, ‘Desiree’, and ‘Rebecca’; see Table 1). In the pain 
condition, the person’s activity was presented as painful and their enjoyment linked to painfulness.  
Moral judgements. Moral judgments about the target were measured with 17 items 
concerning moral traits, thoughts and deeds (αtotal = .93)6.  
Moral and immoral thoughts and deeds. Participants rated the likelihood that the person in 
the vignette would think or act in certain ways with eight items on a seven-point scale (from 1 – Not  
                                                        
5 We aimed to collect 240 participants and closed access to the survey once this quota was 
exceeded. From a batch pool of 318 responses, we excluded 42 participant dropouts (with no 
responses on the variables of interest), and 37 participants for whom condition allocation was 
uncoded, leaving N = 239. 
6 Crohnbach’s alpha for each target as follows, Briana: α = .92; Michael: α = .90; John: α = .95; 
Amanda: α = .95; Daniel: α = .93; Brad: α = .89; Desiree: α = .95; Rebecca: α = .93.  
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Table 1.  
Vignettes describing the target person and activity with pain-liking and no-pain versions. 
Target Pain vignette No-pain vignette 
Briana 
 
Briana liked to run until her muscles 
ached. She would make sure to run so far 
that she felt an almost unbearable burning 
soreness in her thigh muscles as she ran. 
Briana liked to run until her muscles 
felt good. She would make sure that 
she ran far enough so she knew she 
was pushing her physical limits. 
Michael 
 
Michael enjoyed wrapping cotton around 
his index finger. He would pull the string 
tighter, watching the tip of his finger 
change color and feeling it throb. 
Michael enjoyed wrapping cotton 
around his index finger. He would use 
the string to make different patterns, 
watching the tip of his finger until it 
was fully covered by the cotton. 
John 
 
John liked to wear an elastic band around 
his wrist to flick against his skin. He 
enjoyed pulling the elastic band taut and 
letting it go again, until his skin would 
smart. 
John liked to wear a bracelet around 
his wrist. He liked how it would 
move around when he gestured and 
found that wearing it gave him a 
feeling of security. 
Amanda 
 
Amanda felt good pulling the skin away 
from her cuticles. Removing each loose 
end of skin gave her a flickering twinge 
of pain.    
Amanda felt good pulling the skin 
away from her cuticles. Removing 
each loose end of skin made her 
hands look more feminine. 
Daniel 
 
Daniel liked to tap his bruised shins after 
a game of football. He liked the dull 
painfulness of the sensation in his legs, 
and would keep going until the feeling 
almost got too much. 
Daniel liked to tap his bruised shins 
after a game of football. He liked the 
feeling of relief that this gave him, 
and would keep going until the 
feeling was no longer there. 
Brad 
 
Brad loved to eat hot chili and liked the 
stinging feeling on his tongue and lips. 
He would make sure the chili went 
directly onto his tongue to increase the 
sting, and would hold it there until he 
almost couldn’t take it anymore. 
Brad loved to eat hot chili and liked 
the sensation on his tongue and lips. 
He would make sure the chili went 
directly onto his food to increase the 
effectiveness, and continue to add 
chili until it was as hot as he could 
handle. 
Desiree 
 
Desiree enjoyed putting lemon juice on 
her finger if she got a papercut. She 
would stretch the edges of the cut to 
ensure that she could feel the lemon juice 
burning into her finger. 
Desiree enjoyed putting lemon juice 
on her fingers if she touched 
something dirty. She would wipe the 
juice over her hand to ensure that any 
bacteria would be removed. 
Rebecca 
 
Rebecca sometimes liked to put her index 
finger into hot candle wax as it pooled 
beneath the candle flame. She would 
submerge her finger into the burning hot 
liquid, letting the burning sensation build 
up until she almost had to stop. 
Rebecca sometimes liked to put her 
index finger into warm candle wax as 
it pooled beneath the candle flame. 
She would submerge her finger into 
the warm wax, letting the wax mold 
into different shapes. 
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at all likely to 7 – Very likely). Three items measured moral thoughts and deeds (‘Feel love and 
kindness towards others, ‘Feel concern for less fortunate others’, ‘Give money to a charity’), with 
five items measuring immoral thoughts and deeds (‘Have lustful thoughts’, ‘Tell a lie’, ‘Cheat 
others’, ‘Become aggressive towards others’, ‘Treat others unfairly’), which were reverse scored. 
 Moral traits. We gauged moral traits with a measure based on the nine traits included the 
Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure (Reed & Aquino, 2003). With nine items on a seven-
point scale, participants rated the extent to which each moral trait (caring, compassionate, fair, 
friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest and kind) described the person in the vignette 
(from 1 – Not at all to 7 – Very much so).  
To quantify disgust and strangeness, participants gave normative judgments about the 
person’s behaviour. We asked participants to rate whether the person’s behavior was strange (‘How 
normal do you think this behavior is?’, from 1 – Very normal to 7 – Very strange; shared by others: 
‘How many people do you think share enjoyment of this experience?’, from 1 –  Very few to 7 – 
Almost everyone)7; and disgusting: (‘How disgusting do you think this behavior is?’, from 1 – Not 
at all  to 7 – Very much so). 
Results 
 Independent-groups t-tests revealed a consistent pattern of differences between the pain and 
no-pain conditions (see Table 2, Figure 1). We found that pain-likers received lower moral 
judgements (M = 3.89, SD = .94) than the no-pain control (M = 4.15, SD = .96; t(237) = -3.58, p < 
.000, 95% CIdiff [-.6789, -.1971], d = 0.46). Specifically, pain-likers were considered less likely to 
undertake moral thoughts and deeds (M = 4.15, SD = 1.20) than the control condition (M = 4.55, SD 
= 1.03; t(237) = -2.81, p = .005, 95% CIdiff [-.6934, -.1220], d = 0.36), and were seen as more likely 
to undertake immoral thoughts and deeds (M = 4.58, SD = 1.06) than control vignettes (M = 4.01, 
SD = 1.11, t(237) = 4.02, p < .000, 95% CIdiff [.2872, .8395], d = .53). Pain likers were also 
considered lower in moral traits (M = 4.07, SD = 1.17) than the no-pain analogues (M = 4.45, SD = 
1.19, t(237) = -2.45, p = .014, 95% CIdiff [-.6795, -.0774], d = .32).  
  
                                                        
7 Spearman-Brown’s rho (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013) for each target as follows, Briana: ρ 
= .32; Michael: ρ = .44; John: ρ = .77; Amanda: ρ = .66; Daniel: ρ = .59; Brad: ρ = .78; Desiree: ρ = 
.30; Rebecca: ρ = .78.  
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics and significance testing for morality variables. 
 M (SD) t p d 
Pain No-pain     
Moral judgement 3.89 (.94) 4.33 (.96) -3.58 .000 .46 
Moral thoughts and deeds 4.15 (1.20) 4.55 (1.03) -2.81 .005 .36 
Immoral thoughts and deeds 4.58 (1.06) 4.01 (1.11) 4.02 .000 .53 
Moral traits 4.07 (1.17) 4.45 (1.19) -2.45 .014 .32 
Unconventional 4.44 (1.49) 5.10 (1.27) 3.70 .000 .48 
Disgusting 3.26 (1.90) 2.48 (1.73) 3.28 .001 .43 
Figure 1. Moral judgements of pain and no-pain enjoyment. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
interval. Higher scores on moral judgments indicate more favourable ratings.  
 
 We then tested the mediators of disgusting and unconventional with the PROCESS macro 
(Model 4) with 5000 bootstrapped samples (see Figure 2). We tested a model in which disgusting 
and unconventional served as parallel mediators of the relationship between pain enjoyment 
(predictor) and moral judgments (outcome; Hayes & Preacher, 2013). For clarity, we reverse-scored 
moral judgements so that the dependent variable would represent moral downgrading. These 
analyses showed significant indirect effects via disgusting (IE = .087, SE = .0602, 95% CI [.0323, 
.1811]) and unconventional (IE = .2091, SE = .0367, 95% CI [.1032, .3400]).  
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Figure 2. Process model showing a parallel indirect effect of pain enjoyment on moral 
downgrading via disgusting and unconventional. Index of parallel mediation = .2961, SE = .0724, 
CI [.1613, .4480], R2 = .36. 
 
In sum, Study 1 provided evidence that pain likers were seen as less moral and more 
immoral; and their behaviour as more unconventional, transgressive and disgusting, compared to a 
no-pain counterpart. Mediation analyses suggest that moral downgrading was explained by pain 
enjoyment being both disgusting and unconventional.  
However, because of the varied nature of vignette scenarios and targets across conditions 
(i.e. differences between scenarios not related to pain and enjoyment specifically), it was not 
possible to rule out whether these effects were artefactual to this set of vignettes themselves or 
specific to pain enjoyment. We therefore sought to conceptually replicate and extend these findings 
with Study 2, in which we provided more tightly controlled vignettes, and manipulated enjoyment 
while keeping pain constant. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we again presented participants with vignettes describing a single person 
experiencing pain. We provided vignettes that comprised fewer scenarios and which were more 
tightly comparable across conditions – getting a tattoo and going to the dentist. We held pain 
constant and manipulated enjoyment. We also included a neutral condition to provide a more 
conservative test of the pain enjoyment effect, with the target person either enjoying, neutral or 
unconventional 
b
direct
 = .14, p = .175, (b
total
 = .44, p < .001) 
b = .11, p < .001 
pain 
enjoyment 
(0,1) 
disgusting 
moral downgrading 
b = .77, p = .001 
b = .66, p < .001 b = .32, p < .001 
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disliking the pain. We then measured moral judgments of that target person, in order to test whether 
pain enjoyment was morally downgraded relative to disliking pain and neutral pain.  
Method 
Participants and Design  
The sample comprised 312 participants8 (166 male, Mage = 33.65 years, 59% non-white) 
recruited through MTurk, with 87% reporting English as their first language. We used a 3x2 
experimental design and manipulated enjoyment (three conditions, liking: N = 107, neutral: N = 
101, and disliking: N = 104); and activity (two conditions, tattoo: N = 157, or dental procedure: N = 
155). Each participant was randomly allocated to condition and exposed to a single vignette of a 
person experiencing pain and their liking, neutrality, or disliking with regard to the experience.   
Procedure, Materials and Measures 
As for Study 1, participants were recruited through MTurk, provided with study 
information, and invited to give informed consent. Each participant viewed a single vignette 
describing a person engaging in the painful activity (described below). Then participants were 
asked to complete the morality judgements questionnaire. Finally, participants reported their 
demographic information, and were debriefed, thanked and paid for their time. 
Vignettes. Each participant viewed a pain vignette describing a person ‘Jennifer’ engaging 
in a painful activity that is relatively common (either getting a tattoo or having a dental procedure). 
Jennifer subsequently rated the activity as very painful (i.e. at 9 out of 10, where 10 means 
‘extremely painful’; see Table 3). Numerically providing the pain rating provided a more clearly 
defined manifestation of pain than in Study 1. The three enjoyment conditions (dislike, neutral, like) 
were also introduced via a rating from Jennifer (i.e. a 1 out of 10, where 1 means ‘I disliked it very 
much’; see Table 3). Again, numerically stating the enjoyment rating made it clear precisely how 
much enjoyment the target was experiencing. 
Moral judgements. Moral judgments about the target person were measured with 17 items 
concerning moral traits, thoughts and deeds (as described for Study 1 earlier; dental procedure: α = 
.91; tattoo: α = .91;). In a similar approach to Study 1, in order to measure mediators of 
unconventionality and disgust, participants also rated how strange was Jennifer as a person, how 
strange was her behaviour, and how many other people would also like/ feel neutral about/ dislike 
the experience (dental: α = .84; tattoo: α = .78); as well as how disgusting was the particular 
response to the experience.  
  
                                                        
8We aimed to collect 300 participants and closed access to the survey once this quota was exceeded. 
From a batch pool of 325 responses, we excluded 13 participant dropouts (with no responses on the 
variables of interest), leaving N = 312.     
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Table 3. 
Vignettes describing a painful experience in pain-liking, pain-neutral and pain-disliking conditions. 
Pain experience Like 
 
Neutral 
  
 
Dislike 
Jennifer is [having a 
dental procedure/ 
getting a tattoo.] 
 
When asked to 
indicate how she 
felt about the pain, 
she said that she 
enjoyed it. She 
rated her liking for 
the pain as a 9 out 
of 10, where 10 
means “I liked it 
very much”.     
 
When asked to 
indicate how she 
felt about the pain, 
she said that she 
felt neutral about 
it. She rated her 
liking for the pain 
as a 5 out of 10, 
where 5 means “I 
neither liked it or 
disliked it”.     
When asked to 
indicate how she 
felt about the pain, 
she said that she 
did not enjoy it. 
She rated her 
liking for the pain 
as a 1 out of 10, 
where 1 means “I 
disliked it very 
much”.     
 
During the process 
she experiences a lot 
of pain, rating her 
pain as a 9 out of 10, 
where 10 means 
‘extremely painful’.    
 
Results 
The data were analysed with a two-way ANOVA, with enjoyment (liking, neutral, disliking) 
and activity (dental, tattoo) as independent variables, and moral judgments as the outcome variable. 
This revealed a significant main effect of enjoyment on moral judgments, F(2, 306) = 11.23, p 
<.000, η2p = .07 (see Figure 3). There was no main effect of activity, F(2, 306) = .59, ns, nor any 
significant pain by vignette interaction, F(2, 306) = .82, ns. Simple comparisons revealed that pain 
enjoyment attracted significantly lower moral judgements (M = 4.02, SD = 1.03) than neutrality (M 
= 4.37, SD = .86; 95% CIdiff [-.649, -.042]) and significantly lower moral judgements than disliking 
(M = 4.61, SD = .82; 95% CIdiff [-.892, -.289]). There was no significant difference in moral 
judgements between the neutral and disliking conditions.    
We again tested the mediators of disgusting and unconventional with the PROCESS macro 
(Model 4) with 5000 bootstrapped samples (see Figure 4). We tested the same model as for Study 1 
in which disgusting and unconventional served as parallel mediators of the relationship between 
pain enjoyment (predictor) and moral downgrading (outcome). This again showed significant 
indirect effects via disgusting (IE = .081, SE = .0285, 95% CI [.1199, .2852]) and unconventional 
(IE = .1111, SE = .0421, 95% CI [.0334, .2014]). 
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Figure 3. Moral judgements of pain and no-pain enjoyment. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
interval. Higher scores on moral judgments indicate more favourable ratings. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Process model showing a parallel indirect effect of pain enjoyment on moral 
downgrading via disgusting and unconventional. Index of parallel mediation = .1922, SE = .0418, 
CI [.1199, .2852], R2 = .18. 
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In sum, Study 2 provided further evidence that pain likers were seen as less moral and more 
immoral; and their behaviour as more unconventional, and disgusting, compared to a pain-disliking 
and neutral counterpart. Mediation analyses again suggested that moral downgrading was explained 
by pain enjoyment being both disgusting and unconventional. 
General Discussion  
In two studies, we examined the moral status of pain enjoyment. Both studies showed that 
pain enjoyment elicits a moral downgrading from observers, relative to people who are 
experiencing enjoyment without pain (Study 1) and pain without enjoyment (Study 2). Targets 
experiencing pleasure and pain were consistently judged by observers to be less moral, and more 
immoral, in traits, thoughts and behaviours compared to no-pain and no-enjoyment comparison 
conditions. Therefore, it appears that pain enjoyment is morally diagnostic, and attracts moral 
downgrading from others.  
This research makes a straightforward contribution to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence of moral judgements concerning pain enjoyment. Enjoying pain has been represented as 
pathological (American Psychiatric Association, 1987; Freud, 1929), and where careful 
examinations of pain enjoyment have emerged, these have tended toward a more prurient focus 
(Baumeister, 1988, 1989/2014). More recently, descriptive assays of pain and pleasure in sporting 
contexts and in popular culture have added descriptive depth to this phenomenon (Allen, 2003; 
Bridel, 2010; Gard & Meyenn, 2000). However, experimental research into the moral status of pain 
enjoyment was lacking. This work has aimed to fill this gap in the literature and provide a reasoned 
foundation for future research on moral judgements of pain enjoyment across a wider spectrum of 
human endeavour than sexual contexts.   
The aims of the present work were also to examine moral judgments associated with pain 
and pleasure by investigating two possible mediators. We found that disgust and unconventionality 
mediated the relationship between pain enjoyment and moral downgrading. This suggests that pain 
enjoyment violates socio-moral norms and elicits socio-moral disgust, which in turn explains the 
moral downgrading effect. Relevantly to instances of pain, it may be that some forms of pain 
enjoyment also elicit core disgust. This could be particularly relevant for those examples of pain 
enjoyment involving self-directed violations of the body envelope, such as piercing of the skin, 
which also carry salient cues of disease risk (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). However, not all 
pain involves a specific breach of the body envelope; and in the absence of such a breach, socio-
moral norms concerning pain provide a more parsimonious account of the moral downgrading 
effect across the various examples of painful activity. Moreover, enjoying such an experience could 
heighten perceptions of disgust because enjoyment provides the observer confirmatory evidence 
about the target individual’s specific preferences and proclivities – more than simply undertaking 
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the pain-inducing act itself. Future research could valuably tease apart these distinctions by making 
direct comparisons between the two types of pain induction.  
It is worthwhile to note that pain enjoyment can be experienced within the normal spectrum 
of human behaviours that are below a clinical threshold. In more extreme forms, enjoying pain may 
attract associations with pain-seeking manifestations of distress or mental ill health, such as non-
suicidal self injury (Franklin, Lee, et al., 2013; Franklin, Puzia, et al., 2013; Nock, 2009; Selby, 
Nock, & Kranzler, 2014). Importantly, pain-seeking is different to pain enjoyment. Nevertheless, 
against this backdrop, more banal forms of enjoying pain may seem ‘dangerous territory’ (Gard & 
Meyenn, 2000, p. 19): an experience relegated to the territory of subcultures (Bridel, 2010), 
pertaining to sexual deviance, or simply not for mainstream consumption (cf Joyal & Carpentier, 
2017).  
With this in mind, the present research also provides a reflective counterpoint to the growing 
literature on the positives of pain (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et al., 2014). There is increasing 
evidence in support of the positive consequences of pain in many circumstances – shared pain can 
bring people together, by enabling collective connection, identification and meaning-making 
(Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; Ferris, Jetten, Johnstone, et al., 2016; Vezzali et al., 2015). 
However, in a non-collective context, the current work shows how observers can interpret those 
experiences when enjoyment co-occurs, and specifically that pain enjoyment results in moral 
downgrading from others.    
The moral downgrading effect has been observed despite evidence of everyday benign 
masochism being normative (Rozin et al., 2013), and evidence that pain and pleasure together can 
be beneficial in facilitating identity expression and social identification (Ferris et al., manuscript in 
preparation). Notably, these benefits appear to emerge when pleasure and pain are experienced in 
collective contexts. Further research should, in the first instance, seek to determine whether these 
findings replicate in collective settings, or whether the collective context extinguishes the moral 
downgrading effect. From a functional perspective, finding pleasure in pain could allow people to 
maximise pleasure or potentiate future savouring (Croft, Dunn, & Quoidbach, 2014); to derive 
‘silver linings’ or build a growth narrative from past pain that informs future pain experiences – 
such as in the example of personal challenge experiences like ‘Tough Mudder’ (Scott et al., 2017). 
Future research could therefore examine when and why pain and pleasure may be normative within 
social or cultural scaffolds, and examine how these experiences may become normative over time.  
The present research also adds to previous investigations into the moral status of mixed 
affective experiences overall. Past research has investigated enjoyment of others’ pain, such as 
schadenfreude and sadism (Buckels, Jones, & Paulhus, 2013; Cikara & Fiske, 2013; Gromet, 
Goodwin, & Goodman, 2016; Smith et al., 1996), but there has been less focus on observer 
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judgements of own-pain enjoyment, particularly non-sexual pain. These studies therefore provide a 
basis for further examination of the moral status of pain enjoyment, and identification of moral 
judgments that other mixed affective states may garner (Larsen et al., 2004; Rozin et al., 2013). 
Future research should examine whether the moral downgrading effect carries for other forms of 
benign masochism, or whether pain enjoyment represents a special case. 
Conclusion 
Utilitarian philosophers have long suggested that pleasure and pain each carry instructive 
moral value, where these internal experiences and their sequelae can help us know right from 
wrong. Bentham (1789/1907) was explicit in this view when he declared that ‘[n]ature has placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to 
point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do’. If we do seek to maximise 
pleasure, then finding pleasure in aversive places seems one way to do so. However, it appears that 
pain and pleasure together are morally diagnostic for observers, and a stable moral downgrading 
effect is incurred as a result of these affective states being seen as unconventional, and disgusting.  
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
 The aim of this thesis has been to advance a social psychology of pain. Pain is a seminal 
human experience with clear evolutionary value in signalling threats to survival (A. D. Craig, 
2003b); with positive as well as negative psychological consequences (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, et 
al., 2014); and with diverse sociocultural meanings (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000; Glucklich, 2003). 
Viewing pain as more than mere nociception, this thesis has broached new territory in what pain is 
and how it functions, informed by a biopsychosocial understanding of pain (Engel, 1977). Such an 
approach has generated fresh lines of enquiry, with novel theoretical and empirical research along 
four specific themes: a new synthesis of pain overlap and its conceptual boundaries; examination of 
how social groups can modulate pain communication and experience; investigation of the 
psychological and social sequelae of pain and pleasure in the context of a mass gathering; and 
experimental evidence of third party morality judgments associated with pain enjoyment. In short, 
this work has contributed to the advancement of pain research by advocating what may be gained 
from a focus on the psychosocial understanding of pain (Chapter 2), and through considered 
implementation of a biopsychosocial approach to pain (Chapters 3-5). 
Summary of Findings and Implications 
In detail, Chapter 1 provided an introduction to current pain research, and situated the work 
of this thesis within the relevant pain literature to date. The following Chapters proceeded as four 
integrated but discrete lines of research into the social psychology of pain.  
Chapter 2 focused on the overlap of social and physical pain. A critical review and analysis 
of the literature on pain overlap was undertaken (Ferris, Jetten, Hornsey, & Bastian, manuscript in 
revision). This chapter presented a theoretical analysis of the posited overlap between social and 
physical pain, and set out a new synthesis of pain overlap and social pain theory (Eisenberger, 
2015; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). In reflecting on the 
preponderance of evidence ruling in or out the existence of neural overlap, a return to further 
examination of the psychosocial components of pain was proposed. Put simply, theoretical 
integration on the basis of biological (neural or physiological) similarities may gloss over important 
differences in psychological and social aspects of these phenomena. A broken heart is not truly 
broken. The psychosocial aspects of social and physical pain provide us with a framework for 
interrogating and understanding the value of similarities; and for identifying the substance of 
differences in terms of antecedents, cognitions and emotions surrounding pain, and 
sociobehavioural consequences. 
The remaining Chapters formed the empirical contribution of this thesis. Chapter 3 
embarked on an empirical examination of how social context can impact pain – specifically, how 
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salient group memberships modulate the experience and communication of pain (Ferris, Jetten, 
Molenberghs, Bastian, & Karnadewi, 2016). This chapter presented the findings of an fMRI and 
behavioural study in which participants experienced pain while thinking of valued social group 
memberships in the scanner. This showed that participants increased their pain reports when more 
of their own social group memberships were salient – suggesting that an increase in salient groups 
can facilitate pain reporting. When examining behavioural and brain activation results in tandem, 
the data showed that as participants escalated their pain reports as groups increased, there was a 
relative reduction in activation in regions of interest associated with pain (left and right insula and 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex). This implicates pain communication as an adaptive response to 
pain as salient social resources change, and shows how biological and psychological indices of pain 
can be modulated by psychosocial variables such as group salience. This Chapter also highlighted 
the broader theme of a biopsychosocial approach to pain: that thinking about pain in biological, 
psychological and social terms allows us to test hypotheses across these domains to reveal new 
insights about how pain operates. 
While Chapter 3 examined the impact of groups on pain, Chapter 4 investigated the impact 
of pain experienced in the collective – how painful activities can bind people together. Chapter 4 
brought the enterprise into the field with a pre-post survey of adults undertaking an en masse 
midwinter dawn swim. This study examined pain alongside pleasure, and tested a candidate 
psychological mechanism (self-revelation) for the psychosocial benefits of such activities. 
Consistent with previous research on shared pain (Bastian, Jetten, & Ferris, 2014; Xygalatas et al., 
2013), results showed a significant increase in social identification over the course of the swim, 
such that participants felt more bonded and identified more strongly with others after sharing this 
collective activity. Underlying this finding, we found increased trust and social connection with 
other swimmers, and identification with other swimmers as well as the overall festival including 
non-swimmers. We also found that participants experienced a greater sense of self-revelation 
following the swim, and most importantly, that this effect was most strongly evident for those 
reporting high levels of pleasure and pain from the swim.  
Contrary to prior research into sexual masochism, pain and enjoyment revealed the self, 
rather than allowing escape from or annihilation of the self. More broadly, this Chapter also 
highlighted the value of undertaking empirical investigations outside the laboratory to contextualise 
psychosocial investigations with rich ecological validity. These in vivo contexts allow social 
psychology researchers to combine the benefits of empirical research with settings traditionally 
associated with qualitative disciplines such as sociology and anthropology. Particularly for social 
psychologists, this means we can examine psychosocial phenomena ‘in the wild’, where biological, 
psychological and social intersect, such as the collective experience of pain and pleasure en masse.  
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Building on the findings of Chapter 4, the next Chapter investigated how others perceive 
pain enjoyment in terms of moral judgments. Chapter 5 presented experimental evidence on third-
party moral judgments about pain and enjoyment. Across two studies involving large online 
samples, targets who showed pain enjoyment were consistently judged less moral and more 
immoral than no-pain or no-enjoyment controls. These studies showed that in accessing the 
psychosocial dividends available from shared pain and enjoyment (i.e. those demonstrated in 
Chapter 4), people also need to be wary of observers’ moral judgements and the potential for moral 
downgrading. Qualitative evidence has documented the impoverished moral status of pain 
enjoyment, but this Chapter is the first to provide empirical substantiation and to test potential 
mediators of unconventionality and disgust. Given the mediating roles for unconventionality and 
disgust identified in this thesis, pain liking presents an excellent candidate to test a range of relevant 
hypotheses in future moral psychology research. In further linking to the broader themes of this 
thesis, this Chapter also completes the circle in terms of elaborating the perspective of the observer, 
which forms part of the social context in which pain experiences may occur – an important 
ingredient in a biopsychosocial understanding of pain. The Chapter examined observers’ 
judgements about solitary experiences of pain and enjoyment, but the socio-cultural scaffold of 
collective experiences may well extinguish this moral downgrading effect.  
Altogether, the present thesis has provided a new roadmap for examining social and 
physical pain overlap; and across 3 empirical chapters, has examined pain communication, 
identification following shared pain, and moral judgments associated with enjoying pain across 
laboratory, field, and online settings. Within the context of existing literature, this thesis belongs 
within the tradition of other works that have invoked a contextualised, i.e. biopsychosocial 
approach to pain (Morris, 1991). The aim has been to continue consistently within this tradition, 
and to thoughtfully extend on the groundwork that has already been laid. Evidently, the frontiers of 
pain research lie not only in the assessment and treatment of pain pathologies, but also in tracing the 
pain that attends our non-medical lives – the banal pains, the everyday or occasional pains, the 
shared pains, or the subclinical pains.  
These pains are also worthy of scientific understanding, and this thesis has aimed to include 
them within its reach. In other words, this thesis contributes to what might be referred to as a 
normal psychology of pain, in which pain is accepted as valid, diverse, and part of living.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
Overall, this thesis has expounded an investigation into the experience of pain, bound 
together by a commitment to the biopsychosocial approach and its application. Each chapter has 
already delineated some of the constraints, shortcomings and future directions emerging from the 
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work described therein. Therefore the aim of the following passages is to briefly set out some 
overarching points of broader relevance. 
For instance, Chapter 2 was a theoretical chapter reviewing the literature on physical and 
social pain overlap theory, and offering a new synthesis of the relationship between physical and 
social pain. On the surface, this chapter may be seen as a critique of the use of biological indices 
altogether. To the contrary, this work advocates the utilisation of all scientific means of 
understanding pain, including neural, biological and psychophysiological. What it argues against is 
the use of evidence of biological overlap as a basis for the descriptive recategorisation of constructs 
that are multidimensional – i.e. biopsychosocial. Each pain has unique features that are fundamental 
to its operation, and overlap analysis can be undertaken and begun with a biopsychosocial 
perspective front of mind, in order to properly investigate these phenomena along the full range of 
dimensions for investigation presently available to science. Rather presciently, William James 
considered that refutations of the boundaries between various emotions and their ‘shadings’ to be 
overly descriptive and unprofitable; ‘[a]nd not only is it tedious, but you feel that its subdivisions 
are to a great extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham’ 
(James, 1892/2001, p. 242).  
However, by unpacking the antecedents, cognitions, and emotions that are associated with 
each pain, the question of overlap versus difference can be better understood. This brings the focus 
away from description and back to function, just as originally proposed by James himself. 
Therefore, Chapter 2 provides a roadmap for how such an approach can be implemented and 
expanded to support the considered analysis such states.   
Turning to Chapter 3, this study provides experimental evidence of an adaptive response to 
pain linked to changes in salient social groups in a laboratory setting. Pain is inevitable; therefore, 
understanding how valued groups can help group members to endure and support others’ pain is 
important. If valued groups allow us to broadcast our pain, the effectiveness of these pain messages 
in eliciting support is a logical next step. Research into pain catastrophisation has shown there can 
be negative psychosocial consequences to magnifying and ruminating on our pain (Sullivan, 2012; 
Sullivan et al., 1995), including increased risk of pain chronicity. Following replication, there may 
be value in extending this research into ecologically valid settings outside the laboratory. Although 
more extensive clinical applications are beyond the scope of this thesis, consultation with carer and 
pain services consumer groups would be an important component of further developments to enable 
clinical applications of this work to be realised to support consumers and caregivers.  
Chapter 4 takes the literature on shared pain forward by incorporating measurement of 
pleasure. These data support self-revelation as a candidate mechanism for increased social bonding 
from intense affective experiences i.e. pleasurable pain fostered more social identification because 
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participants felt more firmly that they had revealed something about who they are. Due to the 
brevity of our measurement techniques however, there is low resolution in terms of the content of 
the ‘self-revelation’ construct. Fleshing out this psychological construct will allow us to understand 
what precisely was being revealed and to what end – was it revelation of penumbral psychological 
or bodily mastery (as suggested by Fredrickson, 2000; Klein, 2014; Rozin et al., 2013); or 
authenticity, vulnerability, or values (Rossano, 2012; Watson-Jones & Legare, 2016)? The content 
of these revelations cannot be determined with the present data. Therefore, follow up studies with 
festival collectives are planned in order to examine the reproducibility of our findings against the 
backdrop of the extant literature; to elaborate on the substance of the mediator variable of self-
revelation with the addition of more items targeting this construct; and to more robustly test our 
posited predictors of pain and pleasure with the added veracity of a comparison group. The value of 
a comparison group is to implement a quasi-experimental design, which would provide more 
variance in measures of interest, and furnish us with grounds to make a stronger case for causal 
inferences than repeated measures data (noting the inherent limitations of quasi-experimental 
design, such as non-random allocation to groups). 
Chapter 5 provided reproducible evidence of the moral downgrading of pain enjoyment, and 
invites further investigation of how others regard this phenomenon from a moral standpoint. The 
present set of studies identify unconventionality and disgust as mediators to explain why pain 
enjoyment is morally diagnostic (Gray & Keeney, 2015). These studies responded to the identified 
need for experimental evidence of the basic phenomenon of moral downgrading of pain enjoyment 
by onlookers; and the design of this series of experiments removed the potentially confounding 
contribution of specific social or cultural settings, given that the focus was on pain and enjoyment 
in solitary situations. Nevertheless, orienting to social and cultural settings provides ecological 
validity, and contextualises pain consistent with the biopsychosocial approach espoused within this 
thesis. Social context would indeed be an appropriate variable to manipulate formally in future 
research – for instance to test whether the moral downgrading effect holds for collective pain 
enjoyment in which social information is provided. For example, to specifically determine whether 
sharing pain enjoyment extinguishes moral downgrading; or alternatively, whether enjoyment of 
costly signalling activities (such as religious practices, painful mass gatherings etc.) undermines the 
perceived value of costly behaviours in the eyes of third party observers; and whether this explains 
the moral downgrading effect of pain enjoyment.  
Ultimately, the findings from Chapter 4 suggest that there are positives to be found in 
collective pain and enjoyment; yet Chapter 5 highlights the need for caution in light of the potential 
for moral downgrading by others. This is consistent with other research documenting Western 
societies’ at times fraught relationship with pleasure and pain (Allen, 2003; Halttunen, 1995), and 
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the associated stigma linked with pain enjoyment in sexual domains (Baumeister, 1988, 1989/2014) 
despite its prevalence (Joyal & Carpentier, 2017). This indicates that there may be significant social 
barriers for individuals in pain to access alternative narratives and cognitive frames for their 
suffering, particularly involving pleasure (Aldrich & Eccleston, 2000). As noted, the question of 
whether moral downgrading occurs in collective contexts is therefore an important avenue for 
future research.   
More broadly, as technological advancements proceed, we can expect pain research to not 
only look closer, but also step back to take in the bigger picture. In addition to high-resolution 
discoveries of nociceptor characterisation (e.g., Julius & Basbaum, 2001) and functional description 
of pathways and neural networks associated with pain (C. R. Chapman, Tuckett, & Song, 2008; 
Price, 2000; Wager et al., 2013; Wager et al., 2004; Woo et al., 2014), substantial research has 
expanded on the psychological and social underpinnings of pain, including delineation of sensory 
and affective components of pain (Fernandez & Turk, 1992); extensive elaboration of psychological 
antecedents, modulators, and consequences of pain (e.g., Krahe, Springer, Weinman, & Fotopoulou, 
2013; Price, Hirsh, & Robinson, 2008; Riva et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2012; Sullivan et al., 1995; 
Tracey, 2010). This thesis has brought together the lessons from prior work and set them forth into 
new directions, in the hope of meaningfully progressing our understanding of pain.  
Conclusions 
Pain is ubiquitous, complex, and yet beguilingly simple. Understanding the role of pain in 
people’s lives is an ongoing human endeavour, and critical territory for social psychology alongside 
other disciplines. This thesis has made a contribution to knowledge about how pain functions as a 
part of the human condition, within social contexts and in tandem with pleasure. This thesis belongs 
within a broader tradition of pain research in which this subjective experience is seen as more than 
purely medical or physiological – and rather, as a biopsychosocial phenomenon. Alongside this 
thesis, more and more research now focuses on the social side of the pain equation (Bastian, Jetten, 
& Ferris, 2014; Ferris, Jetten, Johnstone, et al., 2016; Jones & Jetten, 2011; Xygalatas et al., 2013). 
Pain indelibly mars the lives of acute and chronic sufferers, but it also takes place in non-clinical 
populations and outside medical settings, which is also deserving of scientific inquiry. Social 
psychology has an important role in the broader scientific efforts toward understanding pain, with 
its broad levels of analysis providing the theoretical and empirical tools to measure how social 
context deeply informs what pain is and how it functions.  
Pain can be relieved, exacerbated, tolerated, catastrophised. It may seem senseless and cruel, 
lonely, unspeakable; or be cherished for what it represents, and its capacity to cut through our 
differences and bring us together. There are times when it seems pain will always confound us – at 
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the end of it, making sense of pain is all that we may ask of ourselves. In modest ways, this thesis 
has offered some inroads and new paths toward making sense of pain.     
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Chapter 3 Data Availability Statement 
Data files for Chapter 4 are available from the Open Science Framework database at 
http://osf.io/ejxvs   
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Appendix B 
Chapter 4 Supplementary Materials   
Pre- and post-event questionnaires measured additional variables not reported earlier for 
brevity. These include 2 items relating to similarity and connection with animals (Amiot & Bastian, 
2015, 2017); 2 pictorial items relating to identity fusion with other swimmers at the festival (Swann 
et al., 2009; Swann et al., 2012); 2 items on self-esteem and meaningful existence (I feel good about 
myself; My existence is meaningful) related to fundamental psychological needs (K. D. Williams, 
2007b); and 1 item on how much participation in the event allowed the participant to ‘get back to 
basics’. 
Supplementary Table 1.  
Pre- and post-event descriptive statistics, paired t-test outcomes, and effect size  
 M (SD)     
 Pre-event Post-event t p 95% CIdiff  d 
       
Animal 
connection 
 
4.69
  
(1.78) 4.79
  
(1.81) 1.13 .260 [-.077, .283] -.08 
Animal 
similarity 
 
4.83 (1.43) 4.88 (1.79) 0.67 .505 [-.101, .205] -.05 
Identity 
fusion 
with 
swimmers 
 
3.19 (1.23) 3.74 (1.12) 7.23 <.001 [.398, .696] .53 
Identity 
fusion with 
festival 
 
2.93 (1.12) 3.17 (1.05) 3.62 <.001 [.110, .374] .26 
Self-esteem 
 
5.74 (1.30) 6.27 (1.01) 6.25 <.001 [.363, .699] .46 
Meaningful 
existence 
 
5.69 (1.43) 5.92 (1.36) 3.06 .003 [.084, .390] .21 
Back to basics 4.93 (1.87) 5.45 (1.62) 4.70 <.001 [.299, .732] .35 
         
 
